Representational Theories of Consciousness
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Abstract
This chapter focuses on "representational theories of consciousness", which attempt to reduce consciousness to "mental representations" instead of directly to neural states. It illustrates the examples of representational theories that include first-order representationalism (FOR), which attempts to explain conscious experience primarily in terms of world-directed (or first-order) intentional states, and higher-order representationalism (HOR), which holds that what makes a mental state M conscious is that a HOR is directed at M. The chapter discusses a related view, often called "self-representationalism". Rosenthal&s;s view about the extrinsic nature of the HOR has come under attack in recent years and thus various hybrid representational theories can be found in the literature. One interesting recent area of emphasis has been on how HOR and self-representationalism might be realized in the brain. Most representationalists think that their accounts of the structure of conscious states are realized in the brain.
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Citations
Cited by
Limanowski, J., & Friston, K. (2018) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2018.00643 · Cited by 154
Consciousness, Representation, Action: The Importance of Being Goal-Directed
Pennartz, C. M. A. (2018) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2017.10.006 · Cited by 49
Consciousness and its hard problems: Separating the ontological from the evolutionary.
Lacalli, T. (2023) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2023.1196576 · Cited by 4
“, 2000; Levin, 2023), including higher-order and other representational theories (Gennaro, 2018; Lycan, 2019).”
BackgroundLacalli, T. (2025) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2025.1648930 · Cited by 1
“So, for example, consider representational theories (Gennaro, 2018) or computational ones (Sun and Franklin, 2007; Stinson, 2018), for which consciousness is supposed to arise from a processes, basically computational or algorithmic in character, set in motion by the connectome (the spike code of…”
Lacalli, T. (2026) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2026.1829430
“To ground the argument further in some particulars, consider a representational theory (see Gennaro, 2018 on representational theories) where the conversion option would simply convert unconscious representations directly into conscious ones.”
Metadata
- Authors
- Gennaro, R. J.
- Venue
- The Routledge Handbook Of Consciousness
- Publisher
- Routledge
- Published
- 2018-03-15
- Pages
- 107-121
- OpenAlex
- W2913830908
- Cited by
- 43
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 36.79
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Gennaro, R. J. (2018). Representational Theories of Consciousness. The Routledge Handbook Of Consciousness. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315676982-9
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