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A Defence of Common Sense
Abstract
The chapter presents some of the most important points in which philosophical position differs from positions taken up by philosophers. Some philosophers seem to have thought legitimate to use the word &s;true&s; in a sense that a proposition which is partially false may nevertheless also be true; and some of these, therefore, would perhaps say that propositions are in their view, true, when all the time they believe that every such proposition is partially false. This chapter introduces four expressions namely, &s;material things are not real&s;, &s;space is not real&s;, &s;time is not real&s; and &s;the self is not real&s; unlike the expressions used here is really ambiguous. Any view, therefore, incompatible with the proposition that many propositions corresponding to each of the propositions can only be true on the hypothesis that no philosopher has ever held any such view. The chapter also presents facts such as &s;physical fact&s; and &s;mental fact&s;.
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Citations
Cited by
Williamson, T. (2007) · Wiley eBooks · doi:10.1002/9780470696675 · Cited by 2,277
The Transparency of Experience
Martin, M. G. F. (2002) · Mind & Language · doi:10.1111/1468-0017.00205 · Cited by 1,092
Monism: The Priority of the Whole
Schaffer, J. (2010) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.1215/00318108-2009-025 · Cited by 925
Understanding Wittgenstein’s On Certainty
Moyal-Sharrock, D. (2004) · Palgrave Macmillan UK eBooks · doi:10.1057/9780230504462 · Cited by 533
Common Sense as Evidence: Against Revisionary Ontology and Skepticism
KELLY, T. (2008) · Midwest Studies In Philosophy · doi:10.1111/j.1475-4975.2008.00165.x · Cited by 105
Metadata
- Venue
- Philosophical Papers
- Publisher
- Routledge
- Published
- 2014-06-03
- Pages
- 32-59
- ISSN
- 0556-8641 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3004641271
- Cited by
- 188
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 107.41
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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