The DOI matches its Crossref record; 22 of the 22 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Cooperation in public-goods experiments: kindness or confusion?
Abstract
The persistence of cooperation in public-goods experiments has become an important puzzle for economists. This paper presents the first systematic attempt to separate the hypothesis that cooperation is due to kindness, altruism, or warm-glow from the hypothesis that cooperation is simply the result of errors or confusion. The experiment reveals that, on average, about half of all cooperation comes from subjects who understand free-riding but choose to cooperate out of some form of kindness. This suggests that the focus on errors and 'learning' in experimental research should shift to include studies of preferences for cooperation as well. Copyright 1995 by American Economic Association.
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Citations
Cites
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Self-citationAn Experimental Study of the Centipede Game
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Cited by
Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments
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Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment
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“1See, for example, Sugden (1984), Andreoni (1995), Palfrey and Prisbrey (1997), Anderson et al. (1998), Croson (1998), Sonnemans et al. (1999), Keser and van Winden (2000) and Brandts and Schram (2001).”
BackgroundWhat Do Laboratory Experiments Measuring Social Preferences Reveal About the Real World?
Levitt, S. D., & List, J. A. (2007) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.21.2.153 · Cited by 2,668
The Grammar of Society: The Nature and Dynamics of Social Norms
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Giving According to GARP: An Experimental Test of the Consistency of Preferences for Altruism
Andreoni, J., & Miller, J. (2002) · Econometrica · doi:10.1111/1468-0262.00302 · Cited by 1,936
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Andreoni, J.
- Venue
- Market Failure or Success
- Publisher
- Edward Elgar Publishing
- Published
- 2002-12-18
- Volume
- 85
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 891-904
- OpenAlex
- W1583139675
- Cited by
- 912
- References
- 22
- FWCI
- 174.35
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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