The DOI matches its OpenAlex record; 8 of the 8 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
From Appropriate Emotions to Values
Abstract
There are at least three well-known accounts of value and evaluations which assign a central role to emotions. There is first of all the emotivist view, according to which evaluations express or manifest emotional states or attitudes but have no truth values. Second is the dispositionalist view,
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Cites
McDowell, J. (1994) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 1,824
de Sousa, R. (1987) · The MIT Press eBooks · doi:10.7551/mitpress/5760.001.0001 · Cited by 1,595
Contemporary Theories of Knowledge.
Kornblith, H., & Pollock, J. (1988) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.2307/2108001 · Cited by 1,152
Needs, Values, Truth: Essays in the Philosophy of Value
Wiggins, D. K. (1987) · Cited by 432
Values and secondary qualities
(2006) · Arguing about Metaethics · doi:10.4324/9780203759097-21 · Cited by 256
Oakley, J. (2020) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9781003046288 · Cited by 234
2 Realism and Response‐Dependence
Pettit, P. (2002) · Rules, Reasons, and Norms · doi:10.1093/0199251878.003.0002 · Cited by 221
The Reliability of Sense Perception
Alston, W. P. (1996) · Cornell University Press eBooks · doi:10.7591/9781501720543 · Cited by 137
Cited by
Seeing What to Do: Affective Perception and Rational Motivation
Döring, S. A. (2007) · Dialectica · doi:10.1111/j.1746-8361.2007.01105.x · Cited by 466
Oddie, G. (2005) · doi:10.1093/0199273413.001.0001 · Cited by 415
Rational Capacities, or: How to Distinguish Recklessness, Weakness, and Compulsion
Smith, M. (2003) · Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality · doi:10.1093/0199257361.003.0002 · Cited by 303
Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality
(2003) · doi:10.1093/0199257361.001.0001 · Cited by 285
Akrasia, Collective and Individual
Pettit, P. (2003) · Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality · doi:10.1093/0199257361.003.0004 · Cited by 32
Metadata
- Authors
- Mulligan, K.
- Venue
- Swiss Philosophical Preprint Series
- Published
- 1998-01-01
- Volume
- 81
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 161-188
- ISSN
- 1662-937X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1977514609
- Cited by
- 262
- References
- 8
- Type
- posted content
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.