Evolutionary Transition Markers and the Origins of Consciousness
Open accessAbstract
Unlimited associative learning (UAL) has recently been advanced as an epistemic marker for the evolutionary origin of consciousness. One feature of this approach is that it eschews theoretical commitments concerning the mechanisms responsible for consciousness. We argue that the plausibility of the UAL framework depends on making such theoretical commitments. Without such commitments, the UAL framework remains silent regarding important edge cases and fails to distinguish between clusters and clutters of properties sufficient for consciousness. We conclude that the UAL framework would benefit from returning to earlier theory-heavy approaches — i.e.those that make substantial commitments to the mechanisms responsible for consciousness.
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Theory-neutral approaches to consciousness have the problem that absent a theoretical basis, there is little reason to suppose that features like UAL are reliable markers of consciousness.
“The obvious problem with such ‘theory-neutral’ approaches is that absent a theoretical basis, there is little reason to suppose that features like UAL are reliable markers of consciousness [47].”
From Consciousness at sea (2025) · cites this paper as [47]
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“All animals are conscious”: Shifting the null hypothesis in consciousness science
Andrews, K. (2024) · Mind & Language · doi:10.1111/mila.12498 · Cited by 40 · see citing works
Phenomenal interface theory: a model for basal consciousness
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- Authors
- Halina, M., Harrison, D., & Klein, C.
- Affiliations
- University of Cambridge (GB)
- Australian National University (AU)
- Venue
- Journal of Consciousness Studies
- Publisher
- Imprint Academic Ltd
- Published
- 2022-03-31
- Volume
- 29
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 62-77
- ISSN
- 1355-8250 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W4220786876
- Cited by
- 19
- References
- 9
- Citations by year
- 2025: 16 · 2024: 3
- FWCI
- 4.38
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- philpapers.org
- Locations
- Journal of Consciousness Studies (publishedVersion)
- PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
- ANU Open Research (Australian National University) (submittedVersion)
- Apollo (University of Cambridge) (submittedVersion)
- Apollo
- Funders
- Templeton World Charity Foundation
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy and History of Science
- Keywords
- epistemic markers, associative learning
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