The DOI matches its Crossref record; 88 of the 88 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Sorting and Incentive Effects of Pay for Performance: An Experimental Investigation
Abstract
Agency theory highlights losses in productivity that may occur when the interests of owners and employees are imperfectly aligned. Pay for performance has been proposed as a solution to this problem. Using a real—effort laboratory experiment with salient incentives, we compared pay—for—performance and fixed—salary compensation. The former achieved significantly higher firm productivity through both sorting and incentive effects. In particular, more productive employees selected pay for performance, and employees on average, regardless of their preferred compensation scheme, produced more under it. However, more risk—averse individuals were less likely to select pay for performance and less responsive to its incentives.
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Cited by
Performance Pay and Multidimensional Sorting: Productivity, Preferences, and Gender
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6 Pay and Performance: Individuals, Groups, and Executives
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Getting rid of performance ratings: Genius or folly? A debate
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SELF‐SELECTION AND THE EFFICIENCY OF TOURNAMENTS
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Kunze, F., & Menges, J. I. (2017) · Journal of Organizational Behavior · doi:10.1002/job.2129 · Cited by 77
Metadata
- Authors
- Cadsby, C. B., Song, F., & Tapon, F.
- Venue
- Academy of Management Journal
- Publisher
- Academy of Management
- Published
- 2007-04
- Volume
- 50
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 387-405
- ISSN
- 0001-4273 (ISSN-L)
- 1948-0989
- OpenAlex
- W2061006503
- Cited by
- 434
- References
- 88
- FWCI
- 46.01
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.