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Cited by 298

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 92 of the 92 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Agency Theory Revisited: CEO Return and Shareholder Interest Alignment

Nyberg, Anthony J., Fulmer, Ingrid Smithey, Gerhart, Barry, Carpenter, Mason A.·2010·Academy of Management Journal

Abstract

Agency theory suggests that managerial mischief may occur when the interests of owners and managers diverge and that a solution to this agency problem is alignment of owner and agent interests through agent compensation and equity ownership. We develop the theoretical concept of CEO return and measure and estimate financial alignment as the relationship between CEO and shareholder returns. Our results, based on this new conceptualization and corresponding measurement, suggest stronger alignment than reported in previous work. The magnitude of this alignment is associated with subsequent firm performance, but in ways not clearly articulated or tested in prior research.

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Registry

Crossref · 10.5465/amj.2010.54533188

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Metadata

Authors
Nyberg, A. J., Fulmer, I. S., Gerhart, B., & Carpenter, M. A.
Venue
Academy of Management Journal
Published
2010-10
Volume
53
Issue
5
Pages
1029-1049
ISSN
  • 0001-4273 (ISSN-L)
  • 1948-0989
OpenAlex
W3121665884
Cited by
298
References
92
FWCI
31.51
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Agency Theory Revisited: CEO Return and Shareholder Interest Alignment. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.5465/amj.2010.54533188
The paper
Nyberg, A. J., Fulmer, I. S., Gerhart, B., & Carpenter, M. A. (2010). Agency Theory Revisited: CEO Return and Shareholder Interest Alignment. Academy of Management Journal. https://doi.org/10.5465/amj.2010.54533188

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.