The DOI matches its Crossref record; 87 of the 87 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Dark Side of Board Political Capital: Enabling Blockholder Rent Appropriation
Abstract
Resource dependence theorists argue that boards of directors with political capital can benefit focal firms by reducing uncertainty and providing preferential resources. Here, we develop theory regarding the downside of board political capital. The problem of principal–principal agency is evident in many parts of the world, and we argue that board political capital can further exacerbate it by enabling large blockholders to undertake more appropriation of firm wealth. Further, we explore how this enabling effect is moderated by ownership-, industry-, and environment-level contingencies. We find empirical support for our arguments using 32,174 directors in 1,046 Chinese listed firms over the period 2008–2011. Our study sheds light on new ways in which resource dependence and agency theories can be integrated to advance the extant research on board governance and corporate political strategy.
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Cited by
State-owned enterprises in China: A review of 40 years of research and practice
Lin, K. J., Lu, X., Zhang, J., & Zheng, Y. (2020) · China Journal of Accounting Research · doi:10.1016/j.cjar.2019.12.001 · Cited by 654
State Ownership and Political Connections
Tihanyi, L., Aguilera, R. V., Heugens, P., van Essen, M., Sauerwald, S., Duran, P., & Turturea, R. (2019) · Journal of Management · doi:10.1177/0149206318822113 · Cited by 299
Wang, K., & Jiang, W. (2021) · Journal of Cleaner Production · doi:10.1016/j.jclepro.2021.128029 · Cited by 166
Integration of non‐market and market activities in cross‐border mergers and acquisitions
Ahammad, M. F., Tarba, S. Y., Frynas, J. G., & Scola, A. (2017) · British Journal of Management · doi:10.1111/1467-8551.12228 · Cited by 64
Metadata
- Authors
- Sun, P., Hu, H. W., & Hillman, A. J.
- Venue
- Academy of Management Journal
- Publisher
- Academy of Management
- Published
- 2016-10
- Volume
- 59
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 1801-1822
- ISSN
- 0001-4273 (ISSN-L)
- 1948-0989
- OpenAlex
- W2296979395
- Cited by
- 315
- References
- 87
- FWCI
- 28.08
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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