The DOI matches its OpenAlex record; 87 of the 87 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Privatization in Emerging Economies: An Agency Theory Perspective
Abstract
The ineffectiveness of several privatized firms within emerging economies underscores the importance of agency theory issues and their impact on the privatization-performance relationship. The authors argue that weak governance and limited protection of minority shareholders intensify traditional principal-agent problems (perquisite consumption and entrenchment) and create unique agency problems (expropriation). The authors suggest that postprivatization performance can be enhanced by using appropriate ownership, management, and corporate structures that mitigate agency problems in the context of weak governance, and they highlight avenues for research.
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Citations
Cites
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Fama, E. F., & Jensen, M. C. (1983) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/467037 · Cited by 19,058
Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers
Jensen, M. C. (1986) · Cited by 17,275
A Survey of Corporate Governance
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The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment
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Corporate Ownership Around the World
La Porta, R., Lopez‐De‐Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (1999) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/0022-1082.00115 · Cited by 10,541
Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm
Fama, E. F. (1980) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260866 · Cited by 10,466
Cited by
Strategy Research in Emerging Economies: Challenging the Conventional Wisdom*
Wright, M., Filatotchev, I., Hoskisson, R. E., & Peng, M. W. (2005) · Journal of Management Studies · doi:10.1111/j.1467-6486.2005.00487.x · Cited by 1,843
Van Slyke, D. M. (2006) · Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory · doi:10.1093/jopart/mul012 · Cited by 885
Douma, S., George, R., & Kabir, R. (2006) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.535 · Cited by 757
Outside directors and firm performance during institutional transitions
Peng, M. W. (2004) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.390 · Cited by 717
OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE, EXPROPRIATION, AND PERFORMANCE OF GROUP-AFFILIATED COMPANIES IN KOREA.
Chang, S. J. (2003) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.2307/30040617 · Cited by 550
Metadata
- Authors
- Dharwadkar, B., George, G., & Brandes, P.
- Venue
- Academy of Management Review
- Publisher
- Academy of Management
- Published
- 2000-07-01
- Volume
- 25
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 650-669
- ISSN
- 0363-7425 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2128719020
- Cited by
- 621
- References
- 87
- FWCI
- 52.50
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.