Cited by 20Quantum Information and CryptographyWireless Communication Security TechniquesCryptography and Data Security

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“Security of quantum key distribution protocols,”

Open access
Mafu, Mhlambululi, Senekane, Makhamisa·2018·Advanced Technologies of Quantum Key Distribution

Abstract

Quantum key distribution (QKD), another name for quantum cryptography, is the most advanced subfield of quantum information and communication technology (QICT). The first QKD protocol was proposed in 1984, and since then, more protocols have been proposed. It uses quantum mechanics to enable secure exchange of cryptographic keys. In order to have high confidence in the security of the QKD protocols, such protocols must be proven to be secure against any arbitrary attacks. In this chapter, we discuss and demonstrate security proofs for QKD protocols. Security analysis of QKD protocols can be categorised into two techniques, namely infinite-key and finite-key analyses. Finite-key analysis offers more realistic results than the infinite-key one, while infinite-key analysis provides more simplicity. We briefly provide the background of QKD and also define the basic notion of security in QKD protocols. The cryptographic key is shared between Alice and Bob. Since the key is random and unknown to an eavesdropper, Eve, she is unable to learn anything about the message simply by intercepting the ciphertext. This phenomenon is beyond the ability of classical information processing. We then study some tools that are used in the derivation of security proofs for the infinite- and finite-length key limits.

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  • Quantum cryptography provides authentication and unbreakable encryption or unconditional security over traditional cryptographic methods by exploiting the principles of quantum mechanics, such as superposition and entanglement.

    “Quantum cryptography provides authentication and unbreakable encryption or unconditional security over traditional cryptographic methods by exploiting the principles of quantum mechanics, such as superposition and entanglement (Gisin et al., 2002; Mafu and Senekane, 2018).”

    From Quantum technology for development framework as a tool for science diplomacy (2023) · cites this paper as Mafu and Senekane, 2018

    The Introduction (page not provided) contrasts QKD’s quantum-mechanical basis, including entanglement, with the computational basis of conventional cryptography. But §4, “QKD procedure,” says the protocol requires an authenticated classical channel rather than providing authentication itself, and the Introduction says a complete security proof for arbitrary attacks and realistic implementations remains missing. The claim therefore overstates the paper’s support for authentication and unbreakable encryption. (LLM, conf=0.88)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • Quantum communication through quantum cryptography could ensure that diplomatic dialogues remain confidential, fostering improved candid discussions and trust and strengthening international relations.

    “Quantum communication through quantum cryptography (Gisin et al., 2002; Mafu and Senekane, 2018) could ensure that diplomatic dialogues remain confidential, fostering improved candid discussions and trust and strengthening international relations.”

    From Quantum technology for development framework as a tool for science diplomacy (2023) · cites this paper as Mafu and Senekane, 2018

    The Abstract says QKD enables secure exchange of cryptographic keys and can prevent an eavesdropper from learning a message by intercepting its ciphertext. The Introduction cautions that practical implementations still face obstacles to absolute secrecy. Neither section addresses diplomatic dialogue, candour, trust, or international relations. (LLM, conf=0.86)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

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Research works printed but not linked: 57

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Metadata

Authors
Mafu, M., & Senekane, M.
Affiliations
  • Botswana International University of Science and Technology (BW)
  • National University of Lesotho (LS)
Corresponding author
Mafu, Mhlambululi
Venue
Advanced Technologies of Quantum Key Distribution
Publisher
InTech
Published
2018-05-30
OpenAlex
W2737358934
Cited by
20
References
60
Citations by year
2026: 2 · 2025: 2 · 2024: 4 · 2023: 4 · 2022: 3 · 2021: 4 · 2019: 1
FWCI
1.88
Type
book chapter
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • InTech eBooks (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • BiblioBoard Library Catalog (Open Research Library) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
  • Contact-less Assessment of In-vivo Body Signals Using Microwave Doppler Radar (InTech) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Physics and Astronomy › Atomic and Molecular Physics, and Optics › Quantum Information and Cryptography
  • Physical Sciences › Engineering › Electrical and Electronic Engineering › Wireless Communication Security Techniques
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Cryptography and Data Security
Keywords
quantum key distribution, security proofs, finite-key analysis, eavesdropping, key exchange, quantum cryptography

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