Pre-Reflective Self-Consciousness: On Being Bodily in the World
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 8 of the 8 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Empirical and experiential investigations allow the distinction between observational and non-observational forms of subjective bodily experiences. From a first-person perspective, the biological body can be (1) an "opaque body" taken as an intentional object of observational consciousness, (2) a "performative body" pre-reflectively experienced as a subject/agent, (3) a "transparent body" pre-reflectively experienced as the bodily mode of givenness of objects in the external world, or (4) an "invisible body" absent from experience. It is proposed that pre-reflective bodily experiences rely on sensori-motor integrative mechanisms that process information on the external world in a self relative way. These processes are identification-free in that the self is not identified as an object of observation. Moreover, it is defended that observational self-consciousness must be grounded on such identification-free processes and pre-reflective forms of bodily experience.
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Cites
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Cited by
Video ergo sum: manipulating bodily self-consciousness
Lenggenhager, B., Tadi, T., Metzinger, T., & Blanke, O. (2007) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1143439 · Cited by 1,265
Making Sense of Sense-Making: Reflections on Enactive and Extended Mind Theories
Thompson, E., & Stapleton, M. (2009) · Topoi · doi:10.1007/s11245-008-9043-2 · Cited by 501
What is self-specific? Theoretical investigation and critical review of neuroimaging results
Legrand, D., & Ruby, P. (2009) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/a0014172 · Cited by 470
Self-citationScaffoldings of the affective mind
Colombetti, G., & Krueger, J. (2015) · Philosophical Psychology · doi:10.1080/09515089.2014.976334 · Cited by 356
Body ownership and embodiment: vestibular and multisensory mechanisms
Lopez, C., Halje, P., & Blanke, O. (2008) · Neurophysiologie Clinique/Clinical Neurophysiology · doi:10.1016/j.neucli.2007.12.006 · Cited by 270
Metadata
- Authors
- Legrand, D., & Philosophy Documentation Center
- Venue
- Janus Head
- Publisher
- Philosophy Documentation Center
- Published
- 2007
- Volume
- 9
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 493-519
- ISSN
- 1521-9194 (ISSN-L)
- 1524-2269
- OpenAlex
- W3182109012
- Cited by
- 117
- References
- 8
- FWCI
- 1.70
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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