The DOI matches its Crossref record; 21 of the 21 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Cause and Norm
Abstract
Much of the philosophical literature on causation has focused on the concept of “actual” causation, sometimes called “token” causation. In particular, it is this notion of actual causation that many philosophical theories of causation have attempted to capture. In this paper, we address the question: What purpose does this concept serve? As we shall see in the next section, one does not need this concept for purposes of prediction or rational deliberation. What then could its purpose be? We will argue that one can gain an important clue here by looking at the ways in which causal judgments are shaped by people’s understanding of norms.
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Cites
Causality: Models, Reasoning, and Inference
Pearl, J. (2009) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511803161 · Cited by 11,653
Strawson, P. F. (1962) · PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) · Cited by 3,223
Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation
Woodward, J. (2004) · doi:10.1093/0195155270.001.0001 · Cited by 1,302
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Causes and Explanations: A Structural-Model Approach. Part I: Causes
Halpern, J. Y., & Pearl, J. (2005) · The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1093/bjps/axi147 · Cited by 779
The Intransitivity of Causation Revealed in Equations and Graphs
Hitchcock, C. (2001) · The Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.2307/2678432 · Cited by 603
Self-citationPhilosophical Papers, Volume I.
Peacocke, C., & Lewis, D. (1985) · The Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.2307/2026511 · Cited by 584
Mental models and counterfactual thoughts about what might have been
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The Psychology of Counterfactual Thinking
(2007) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9780203963784 · Cited by 255
Cited by
Person as scientist, person as moralist
Knobe, J. (2010) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x10000907 · Cited by 375
Self-citationCausal–explanatory pluralism: How intentions, functions, and mechanisms influence causal ascriptions
Lombrozo, T. (2010) · Cognitive Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.cogpsych.2010.05.002 · Cited by 313
The explanation game: Explaining machine learning models using shapley values
Merrick, L., & Taly, A. (2020) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-57321-8_2 · Cited by 277
Halpern, J. Y., & Hitchcock, C. (2015) · The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1093/bjps/axt050 · Cited by 263
Self-citationExploring the psychology of LLMs’ moral and legal reasoning
Almeida, G. F. C. F., Nunes, J. L., Engelmann, N., Wiegmann, A., & Araújo, M. D. (2024) · Artificial Intelligence · doi:10.1016/j.artint.2024.104145 · Cited by 70
Metadata
- Authors
- Hitchcock, C., Knobe, J., & Journal of Philosophy, I.
- Venue
- Journal of Philosophy
- Publisher
- Philosophy Documentation Center
- Published
- 2009
- Volume
- 106
- Issue
- 11
- Pages
- 587-612
- ISSN
- 0022-362X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1961102364
- Cited by
- 350
- References
- 21
- FWCI
- 55.88
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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