The DOI matches its Crossref record; 29 of the 29 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology
Open accessAbstract
It is argued that there are two ‘master’ intuitions about knowledge⎯an anti-luck intuition and an ability intuition⎯and that these impose distinct epistemic demands. It is claimed that recognising this fact leads one towards a new proposal in the theory of knowledge⎯anti-luck virtue epistemology⎯which can avoid the problems that afflict other theories of knowledge. This proposal is motivated in contrast to two other ways of thinking about knowledge which are shown to be ultimately unsuccessful: anti-luck epistemology and virtue epistemology. Finally, a diagnosis is offered of why our concept of knowledge should have the kind of structure dictated by anti-luck virtue epistemology.
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Citations
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Cited by
Understanding, Explanation, and Scientific Knowledge
Khalifa, K. (2017) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108164276 · Cited by 331
Epistemic Virtue and the Epistemology of Education
Pritchard, D. (2013) · Journal of Philosophy of Education · doi:10.1111/1467-9752.12022 · Cited by 122
Self-citationKnowledge, justification, and (a sort of) safe belief
Whiting, D. (2020) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-018-01905-z · Cited by 34
Pharmacological cognitive enhancement and cheapened achievement: A new dilemma.
Gordon, E. C., & Dunn, L. (2021) · Neuroethics · doi:10.1007/s12152-021-09477-5 · Cited by 6
Metadata
- Authors
- Pritchard, D., & Journal of Philosophy, I.
- Venue
- Journal of Philosophy
- Publisher
- Philosophy Documentation Center
- Published
- 2012
- Volume
- 109
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 247-279
- ISSN
- 0022-362X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1503848103
- Cited by
- 586
- References
- 29
- FWCI
- 261.05
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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