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How Must Knowledge Be Modally Related to What Is Known?
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“Earlier formulations of the safety requirement tended to focus only on the first way in which a subject could fail to be correct (see, e.g., see Sosa 1 3 1999a, Sosa 1999b, and Williamson 2000, 128).However, such formulations are now commonly taken to be too weak, as there are certain cases of coincidentally true beliefs that they fail to capture.”
From Hope for the Evolutionary Debunker: How Evolutionary Debunking Arguments and Arguments from Moral Disagreement Can Join Forces (2022) · cites this paper as Sosa 1999a
In the citing paper
“The Safety Requirement S knows that p only if there are no nearby worlds in which (i) she does not have a correct belief as to whether p and (ii) she uses the same method of beliefformation as the one we actually used to determine whether p is true.”
From Hope for the Evolutionary Debunker: How Evolutionary Debunking Arguments and Arguments from Moral Disagreement Can Join Forces (2022) · cites this paper as Sosa 1999a
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Items 101–200 of 235
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Why better safe than sensitive
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Smith, M. (2016) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198755333.003.0003 · Cited by 2
Does Safety Entail Context-Sensitivity?
Zaar, B. E. A. (2025) · Erkenntnis · doi:10.1007/s10670-025-00960-6 · Cited by 1
Zhao, B. (2025) · Croatian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.52685/cjp.25.73.1 · Cited by 1
Referential Understanding, Luck, and Knowledge of Reference
Tamburini, V. (2025) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.1111/phpr.70045 · Cited by 1
Virtue epistemology - Epistemologia da virtude
Santos, B. R. G., & Merlussi, P. (2015) · Intuitio · doi:10.15448/1983-4012.2015.1.19738 · Cited by 2
Lackey, J. A. (2013) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-94-007-5934-3_11 · Cited by 1
Sosa, E. (2018) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781316827413.011 · Cited by 1
Self-citationIntroduction: Meet the Gettier Problem
Hetherington, S. (2018) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781316827413.002 · Cited by 1
Kelly, T. J. (2022) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192842954.003.0001 · Cited by 1
Kelly, T. J. (2022) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192842954.003.0002 · Cited by 1
The Essential Superficiality of the Voluntary
Queloz, M. (2025) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780198926283.003.0010 · Cited by 1
Eyghen, H. V. (2019) · Studia Humana · doi:10.2478/sh-2019-0005 · Cited by 1
The Gettier Problem and Context
Belleri, D., & Coliva, A. (2018) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781316827413.007 · Cited by 1
(2003) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199252732.003.0001 · Cited by 1
The Gettier Problem and Intellectual Virtue
Greco, J. (2018) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781316827413.010 · Cited by 1
THE ANALYSIS OF SELF-DECEPTION: REHABILITATING THE TRADITIONALIST ACCOUNT
Krstić, V. (2018) · ResearchSpace (University of Auckland) · doi:10.13140/rg.2.2.13723.31529 · Cited by 1
Actual Control: Demodalising Free Will
Heering, D. (2020) · White Rose eTheses Online (University of Leeds, The University of Sheffield, University of York) · Cited by 1
The Teacher as Mathematician: Problem Solving for Today's Social Context
Brewster, H. K. (2014) · doi:10.7916/d8736p17
The Problem of Easy Justification
Taylor, S. A. (2013) · doi:10.17077/etd.iqg3wic9
Zalabardo on closure and sensitivity
Gundersen, L. B., & Kallestrup, J. (2014) · Dialnet (Universidad de la Rioja)
The Problem of Easy Justification: An Investigation of Evidence, Justification, and Reliability
Taylor, S. A. (2013) · Iowa Research Online (University of Iowa)
Roush, S. (2005) · doi:10.1093/0199274738.003.0003
Roush, S. (2005) · doi:10.1093/0199274738.003.0004
6 Real Anti‐realism: The Evidential Approach
Roush, S. (2005) · doi:10.1093/0199274738.003.0006
1 Tracking: At Home on the Range
Roush, S. (2005) · doi:10.1093/0199274738.003.0001
Roush, S. (2005) · doi:10.1093/0199274738.003.0002
Littlejohn, C. (2018) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781316827413.005
McBride, M. (2017) · Open Book Publishers · doi:10.11647/obp.0104.10
McBride, M. (2017) · Open Book Publishers · doi:10.11647/obp.0104.09
3. The Problem of Easy Knowledge: Towards a Solution
McBride, M. (2017) · Open Book Publishers · doi:10.11647/obp.0104.05
McBride, M. (2017) · Open Book Publishers · doi:10.11647/obp.0104.02
McBride, M. (2017) · Open Book Publishers · doi:10.11647/obp.0104.13
1. Reflections on Moore’s ‘Proof’
McBride, M. (2017) · Open Book Publishers · doi:10.11647/obp.0104.03
2. First Reflections on the Problem of Easy Knowledge
McBride, M. (2017) · Open Book Publishers · doi:10.11647/obp.0104.04
Um problema para a epistemologia anti-sorte de Pritchard
Rodrigues, L. R. (2017) · Veritas (Porto Alegre) · doi:10.15448/1984-6746.2017.3.28460
Essays on Modalized Epistemology
Hirvelä, J. (2018)
Predictive coding and religious belief
Eyghen, H. V. (2018) · Filosofia Unisinos · doi:10.4013/fsu.2018.193.12
Do Safety Failures Preclude Knowledge?
Fett, J. R. V. (2019) · Principia an international journal of epistemology · doi:10.5007/1808-1711.2018v22n2p301
Sosa’s Safety Condition and Problem of Philosophical Skepticism
Stamenković, B. (2020) · Philosophia · doi:10.1007/s11406-020-00219-0
Motivation, Strategy, and Definition
Alspector‐Kelly, M. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108604093.001
A gnoseologia segundo Ernest Sosa
Salles, J. C. (2021) · Trans/Form/Ação · doi:10.1590/0101-3173.2021.v44dossier2.07.p63
Whiting, D. (2021) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192893956.003.0002
Whiting, D. (2021) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192893956.003.0003
Whiting, D. (2021) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192893956.003.0004
Whiting, D. (2021) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192893956.003.0001
Whiting, D. (2021) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192893956.003.0007
Whiting, D. (2021) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192893956.003.0009
Whiting, D. (2021) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192893956.003.0010
Whiting, D. (2021) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192893956.003.0008
Whiting, D. (2021) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192893956.003.0006
Whiting, D. (2021) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192893956.003.0005
Bootstrapping, Epistemic Circularity, and Justification Closure
Alspector‐Kelly, M. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108604093.011
Alspector‐Kelly, M. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108604093.006
Alspector‐Kelly, M. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108604093.004
Abominable Conjunctions, Contextualism, and the Spreading Problem
Alspector‐Kelly, M. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108604093.010
Alspector‐Kelly, M. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108604093.009
Alspector‐Kelly, M. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108604093.007
Alspector‐Kelly, M. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108604093.002
Alspector‐Kelly, M. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108604093.003
Alspector‐Kelly, M. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108604093.012
Transmission, Skepticism, and Conditions of Warrant
Alspector‐Kelly, M. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108604093.005
Alspector‐Kelly, M. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108604093.008
Alspector‐Kelly, M. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108604093.013
4. Evidence and Transmission Failure
McBride, M. (2017) · Open Book Publishers · doi:10.11647/obp.0104.06
McBride, M. (2017) · Open Book Publishers · doi:10.11647/obp.0104.08
McBride, M. (2017) · Open Book Publishers · doi:10.11647/obp.0104.01
McBride, M. (2017) · Open Book Publishers · doi:10.11647/obp.0104.14
McBride, M. (2017) · Open Book Publishers · doi:10.11647/obp.0104.11
Hudson, H. (2007) · Analysis · doi:10.1111/j.1467-8284.2007.00694.x
McBride, M. (2017) · Open Book Publishers · doi:10.11647/obp.0104.07
McBride, M. (2017) · Open Book Publishers · doi:10.11647/obp.0104.12
The Gettier Problem’s Explicability Problem
Hetherington, S. (2018) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781316827413.015
The Gettier Problem and Externalism
Borges, R. (2018) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781316827413.006
Hetherington, S. (2018) · doi:10.1017/9781316827413.001
Hetherington, S. (2018) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781316827413.016
Hetherington, S. (2018) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781316827413.017
Intuition in the Gettier Problem
Chudnoff, E. (2018) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781316827413.013
Kelly, T. J. (2022) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192842954.003.0003
Kelly, T. J. (2022) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192842954.003.0007
Kelly, T. J. (2022) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192842954.003.0012
The Bias Blind Spot and the Biases of Introspection
Kelly, T. A. F. (2022) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192842954.003.0005
(2022) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192842954.002.0003
Knowledge, Skepticism, and Reliability
Kelly, T. J. (2022) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192842954.003.0010
(2022) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192842954.002.0004
Kelly, T. J. (2022) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192842954.003.0009
Bias Attributions and the Epistemology of Disagreement
Kelly, T. J. (2022) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192842954.003.0011
Symmetry and Bias Attributions
Kelly, T. A. F. (2022) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192842954.003.0008
The Norm-Theoretic Account of Bias
Kelly, T. J. (2022) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192842954.003.0004
Metadata
- Authors
- Sosa, E., & University of Arkansas Press
- Corresponding author
- Sosa, Ernest
- ORCID
- Sosa, Ernest
- Venue
- Philosophical Topics
- Publisher
- Philosophy Documentation Center
- Published
- 1999
- Volume
- 26
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 373-384
- ISSN
- 0276-2080 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2032232876
- Cited by
- 235
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 12 · 2025: 23 · 2024: 9 · 2023: 4 · 2022: 20 · 2021: 21 · 2020: 9 · 2019: 19 · 2018: 25 · 2017: 19 · 2016: 11 · 2015: 3 · 2014: 3 · 2013: 6 · 2012: 3
- FWCI
- 0.00
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Philosophical Topics (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Keywords
- modal knowledge, epistemic modality, truth and knowledge, epistemic logic
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