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Moral relativism and moral objectivity
Abstract
This fine book features a debate over the relative merits/demerits of moral relativism and moral objectivism. Harman (Princeton Univ.), whose The Nature of Morality (CH, Sep'77) continues to influence American "realists" who react to his "anti-realism," defends relativism. Thomson (MIT), whose analysis of moral dilemmas in Rights, Restitution, and Risk (CH, Jan'87) and of rights in The Realm of Rights (CH, May'91) are widely read, defends objectivism. Each presents his or her respective case, and then each has "a go" at the other. Both offer clear, subtle versions of their positions, show great respect for each other, and write so that the argument is accessible to professional philosophers and upper-division undergraduates alike. The book could easily serve as the centerpiece for a course or seminar on contemporary metaethics, because it addresses most of the major issues. What makes the book especially unusual is that it actually advances the argument in an open-ended, illuminating way. It will, this reviewer believes, have an influence similar to that of J.J.C. Smart and Bernard Williams's Utilitarianism: For and Against (CH, Apr'74), which for many years framed the debate about utilitarianism. Highly recommended for all undergraduate and graduate collections and for larger public libraries.
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Citations
Cited by
Liu, D., Liao, H., & Loi, R. (2012) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.5465/amj.2010.0400 · Cited by 761
Sentimental Rules: On the Natural Foundations of Moral Judgement
Nichols, S. (2004) · doi:10.1093/0195169344.001.0001 · Cited by 515
Ignorance and Imagination: The Epistemic Origin of the Problem of Consciousness
Stoljar, D. (2006) · doi:10.1093/0195306589.001.0001 · Cited by 191
Clarke-Doane, J. (2020) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198823667.001.0001 · Cited by 146
Moral Philosophy and the ‘Ethical Turn’ in Anthropology
Klenk, M. (2019) · Zeitschrift für Ethik und Moralphilosophie · doi:10.1007/s42048-019-00040-9 · Cited by 59
Metadata
- Venue
- Choice Reviews Online
- Publisher
- American Library Association
- Published
- 1996-04-01
- Volume
- 33
- Issue
- 08
- Pages
- 33-4427-33-4427
- ISSN
- 0009-4978 (ISSN-L)
- 1523-8253
- OpenAlex
- W2566506169
- Cited by
- 188
- References
- 0
- Type
- book review
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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