The DOI matches its Crossref record; 37 of the 37 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Perceptual Content Defended
Open accessAbstract
Recently, the thesis that experience is fundamentally a matter of representing the world as being a certain way has been questioned by austere relationalists. I defend this thesis by developing a view of perceptual content that avoids the objections of austere relationalists. The main thesis of the paper is that on a relational understanding of perceptual content, the fundamental insights of austere relationalism do not compete with perceptual experience being representational. I argue that most objections to the thesis that experience has content are objections only against accounts of perceptual content on which perceptual relations to the world play no explanatory role. With austere relationalists, I will argue that perceptual experience is fundamentally relational. But against austere relationalists, I will argue that it is fundamentally both relational and representational.
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Searle, J. R. (1983) · Cited by 2,418
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Campbell, J. (2002) · doi:10.1093/0199243816.001.0001 · Cited by 1,525
The Transparency of Experience
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Cited by
The Border Between Seeing and Thinking
Block, N. (2023) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780197622223.001.0001 · Cited by 367
De Se Content and De Hinc Content
Schellenberg, S. (2016) · Analysis · doi:10.1093/analys/anw019 · Cited by 22
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Schellenberg, S.
- Venue
- Noûs
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2011-01-20
- Volume
- 45
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 714-750
- ISSN
- 0029-4624 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1697969269
- Cited by
- 253
- References
- 37
- FWCI
- 5.54
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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