Conscious Volition and Mental Representation: Toward a More Fine-Grained Analysis
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The existence of a stable self-model almost always gives rise to the 'perspectivalness of consciousness' in terms of transient subject-object relationships.
“The existence of a stable self-model also almost always gives rise to the ''perspectivalness of consciousness'' in terms of transient subject-object relationships (see step 6 below; see also Nagel, 1986;Metzinger, 1993, 1995a, 2005a, and especially Metzinger, 2006a).”
From Empirical perspectives from the self-model theory of subjectivity: a brief summary with examples (2007) · cites this paper as Metzinger, 2006a
A phenomenal self as subject appears exactly when the organism possesses a phenomenal model of the intentionality relation.
“a phenomenal self as subject appears exactly when the organism possesses a phenomenal model of the intentionality relation [6,7,9,21,22]”
From Full-body illusions and minimal phenomenal selfhood (2009) · cites this paper as [22]
Cited by
Sorted by citations
Full-body illusions and minimal phenomenal selfhood
Blanke, O., & Metzinger, T. (2009) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2008.10.003 · Cited by 1,060 · see citing works
Self-citationToli, A., Webb, T. L., & Hardy, G. E. (2016) · British Journal of Clinical Psychology · doi:10.1111/bjc.12086 · Cited by 137 · see citing works
Empirical perspectives from the self-model theory of subjectivity: a brief summary with examples
Metzinger, T. (2007) · Progress in Brain Research · doi:10.1016/s0079-6123(07)68018-2 · Cited by 123 · see citing works
Self-citationThe Neurocognitive Bases of Human Volition.
Haggard, P. (2019) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev-psych-010418-103348 · Cited by 126 · see citing works
- Authors
- Metzinger, T.
- Corresponding author
- Metzinger, Thomas
- ORCID
- Metzinger, Thomas
- Venue
- Disorders of Volition
- Publisher
- The MIT Press
- Published
- 2006-05-19
- Pages
- 19-48
- OpenAlex
- W4242992868
- Cited by
- 23
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 1 · 2024: 5 · 2023: 1 · 2022: 1 · 2020: 4 · 2018: 1 · 2017: 1 · 2015: 2 · 2014: 1 · 2013: 2 · 2012: 1
- FWCI
- 1.67
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- The MIT Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Free Will and Agency
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Keywords
- mental representation, free will, conscious action, decision-making, philosophy of mind
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Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
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