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The Subjectivity of Subjective Experience: A Representationalist Analysis of the First-Person Perspective

Open access
Metzinger, Thomas · 2000 · Neural Correlates of Consciousness
Cited by 98

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 9 of the 9 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

Before one can even begin to model consciousness and what exactly it means that it is a subjective phenomenon one needs a theory about what a first-person perspective really is. This theory has to be conceptually convincing, empirically plausible and, most of all, open to new developments. The chosen conceptual framework must be able to accommodate scientific progress. Its ba-sic assumptions have to be plastic as it were, so that new details and empirical data can continuously be fed into the theoretical model as it grows and becomes more refined. This paper makes an attempt at sketching the outlines of such a theory, offering a representationalist analysis of the phenomenal first-person perspective. Three phenomenal target properties are centrally relevant: “mine-ness ” (phenomenal appropriation; the sense of ownership), “selfhood ” (the con-scious experience of being someone), and “perspectivalness ” (a structural fea-ture: phenomenal space as a whole is organized around a center, a supramodal point of view). This contribution analyzes these properties on a representational as well as on a functional level of description. The author introduces new con-

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Crossref · 10.7551/mitpress/4928.003.0026

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Metadata

Authors
Metzinger, T.
Venue
Neural Correlates of Consciousness
Publisher
The MIT Press
Published
2000-08-28
Pages
285-306
OpenAlex
W2108605629
Cited by
98
References
9
FWCI
12.92
Type
book chapter
Language
en
Open access
green

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: The Subjectivity of Subjective Experience: A Representationalist Analysis of the First-Person Perspective. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.7551/mitpress/4928.003.0026
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Metzinger, T. (2000). The Subjectivity of Subjective Experience: A Representationalist Analysis of the First-Person Perspective. Neural Correlates of Consciousness. https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/4928.003.0026

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

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