Perception, Action, and Utility: The Tangled Skein
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 22 of the 22 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Normative theories of learning and decision-making are motivated by a computational-level analysis of the task facing an animal: what should the animal do to maximize future reward? However, much of the recent excitement in this field originates in how the animal arrives at its decisions and reward predictions—-algorithmic questions about which the computational-level analysis is silent.
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Citations
Cites
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“The most detailed articulation of common mechanisms for inference and decision, however, has come from the work of Karl Friston and his colleagues (see Friston, 2010, for a recent review).”
BackgroundAn Introduction to Variational Methods for Graphical Models
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“The generic role commonly imputed to the perceptual system is the computation of this posterior belief (Lee and Mumford, 2003; Knill and Pouget, 2004; Friston, 2005).”
BackgroundDaw, N. D., Niv, Y., & Dayan, P. (2005) · Nature Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nn1560 · Cited by 2,533 · cited 4×
“, 2008); of Bellman’s equation in reinforcement learning (Sutton and Barto, 1998; Dayan and Daw, 2008); of subjective expected utility theory in economics (Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1947; Savage, 1954); and of foraging theory in behavioral ecology (McNamara and Houston, 1980; Stephens and Krebs, 1986).”
BackgroundInfluentialSelf-citationNeural Basis of a Perceptual Decision in the Parietal Cortex (Area LIP) of the Rhesus Monkey
Shadlen, M. N., & Newsome, W. T. (2001) · Journal of Neurophysiology · doi:10.1152/jn.2001.86.4.1916 · Cited by 1,755 · cited 1×
“There, Shadlen and Newsome (2001) observed direction-selective neurons that appeared to integrate motion evidence over time in a manner that predicted the timing of behavioral responses.”
BackgroundNeural correlates of decision variables in parietal cortex
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Hierarchical Bayesian inference in the visual cortex
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“The generic role commonly imputed to the perceptual system is the computation of this posterior belief (Lee and Mumford, 2003; Knill and Pouget, 2004; Friston, 2005).”
BackgroundNeuronal correlates of a perceptual decision
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Cited by
Whatever next? Predictive brains, situated agents, and the future of cognitive science
Clark, A. (2013) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x12000477 · Cited by 5,924
Active Inference, homeostatic regulation and adaptive behavioural control
Pezzulo, G., Rigoli, F., & Friston, K. (2015) · Progress in Neurobiology · doi:10.1016/j.pneurobio.2015.09.001 · Cited by 650
“…been proposed that use belief precisions or related constructs to modulate the balance of model based and model free controllers (Daw et al., 2005; Gershman and Daw, 2012; Lee et al., 2014; Pezzulo et al., 2013), there are some unique features of the Active Inference scheme that make novel and…”
Pezzulo, G., Rigoli, F., & Chersi, F. (2013) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00092 · Cited by 163
“Furthermore, this theory does not consider that model-based computations might have costs , linked to the cognitive effort due to planning (Gershman and Daw, 2011) and to the temporal discounting of the time required for planning (Shadmehr, 2010).”
InfluentialClark, A. (2013) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00270 · Cited by 108
First principles in the life sciences: the free-energy principle, organicism, and mechanism
Colombo, M., & Wright, C. (2021) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-018-01932-w · Cited by 101
Metadata
- Authors
- Gershman, S. J., & Daw, N. D.
- Venue
- Principles of Brain Dynamics
- Publisher
- The MIT Press
- Published
- 2012-07-06
- Pages
- 301-320
- OpenAlex
- W2626452129
- Cited by
- 36
- References
- 22
- FWCI
- 7.48
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Gershman, S. J., & Daw, N. D. (2012). Perception, Action, and Utility: The Tangled Skein. Principles of Brain Dynamics. https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/9108.003.0015
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