Enaction, Imagination, and Insight
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 6 of the 6 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Cognitive science is moving toward a conception of cognition as a biological phenomenon rather than a logical process. In distributed cognition, this shift draws attention to the fine details of interactions between whole persons and their cultural constructed environments for thinking. Recent work in embodied and enacted cognition, suggests new ways to think about fundamental constructs such as representation and the nature of organism/environment relations. These theoretical changes imply some as yet unexplored analytic possibilities. I use a common practice in ship navigation, the use of the “three-minute rule,” to describe some of the major elements of the embodiment premise and enaction framework and show how these imply a new approach to the analysis of on-going activity. I then use this approach to sketch a speculative experimental analysis of an example of real-world problem solving that includes a moment of Aha! insight. Finally, I reflect on how the concept of enacted representation may help us explain how high level cognitive processes can arise from low level perceptual and motor abilities.
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Citations
Cites
Hutchins, E. (1995) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/1881.001.0001 · Cited by 10,801
Self-citationSix views of embodied cognition
Wilson, M. (2002) · Psychonomic Bulletin & Review · doi:10.3758/bf03196322 · Cited by 4,782
A sensorimotor account of vision and visual consciousness
O'Regan, J. K., & Noë, A. (2001) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x01000115 · Cited by 3,126
Duncker, K. (1945) · Psychological Monographs · doi:10.1037/h0093599 · Cited by 2,938
McNeill, D. (2005) · doi:10.7208/chicago/9780226514642.001.0001 · Cited by 2,157 · cited 2×
“This strategy worked well because the language that classical cognitive science had used to describe internal cognitive processes turned out to be perfectly suited to describing external cognitive processes.”
BackgroundThe evolution of mental metaphors in psychology: A 90-year retrospective.
Gentner, D., & Grudin, J. (1985) · American Psychologist · doi:10.1037/0003-066x.40.2.181 · Cited by 196
Cited by
Malafouris, L. (2019) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-018-9606-7 · Cited by 181
“Important to note is that with thinging the focus falls on process ontologies and ecologies (Ingold 2012; Hutchins 2010b; Bateson 1972) rather than on static decontextualized objects, tools or other material structures.”
BackgroundReconceiving representation-hungry cognition: an ecological-enactive proposal
Kiverstein, J. D., & Rietveld, E. (2018) · Adaptive Behavior · doi:10.1177/1059712318772778 · Cited by 150
“Situated in a concrete situation, creative imagination opens one up to hitherto neglected affordances (Van Dijk & Rietveld, under review; Hutchins, 2010).”
BackgroundFroese, T., Woodward, A., & Ikegami, T. (2013) · Adaptive Behavior · doi:10.1177/1059712313483145 · Cited by 51
Metadata
- Authors
- Hutchins, E.
- Venue
- Enaction
- Publisher
- The MIT Press
- Published
- 2010-11-24
- Pages
- 425-450
- OpenAlex
- W2490509748
- Cited by
- 92
- References
- 6
- FWCI
- 12.81
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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