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Human Cooperation among Kin and Close Associates May Require Enforcement of Norms by Third Parties
Abstract
While our capacity for large-scale cooperation is striking, humans also cooperate with kin and close associates much more than most other vertebrates. Existing theories do not satisfactorily explain this difference. Moreover, mechanisms posited for explaining large-scale human cooperation, like norms, third-party judgments and sanctions, also seem to be essential in regulating interactions among kin and close associates. It is hypothesized that norms and third-party judgments are crucial even for small-scale cooperation, and that kin selection and direct reciprocity alone cannot generate the degree of small-scale cooperation needed to sustain the human life history. Published in the Strungmann Forum Reports Series.
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Humans routinely engage in a broader set of small-scale cooperative activities than do our primate relatives, and institutionalized third-party rewards and punishments often regulate such activities.
“Mathew et al. (2013) note that humans routinely engage in a broader set of small-scale cooperative activities than do our primate relatives, and they argue that institutionalized third-party rewards and punishments often regulate such activities.”
From Cultural group selection plays an essential role in explaining human cooperation: a sketch of the evidence. (2016) · cites this paper as Mathew et al. (2013)
Kinship systems in small-scale societies harness, extend, and suppress evolved psychological mechanisms for dealing with relatives.
“The kinship systems that dominate life in small-scale societies variously harness, extend, and suppress evolved psychological mechanisms for dealing with relatives (Mathew et al. 2013).”
From Cultural group selection plays an essential role in explaining human cooperation: a sketch of the evidence. (2016) · cites this paper as Mathew et al. 2013
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Richerson, P., Baldini, R., Bell, A. V., Demps, K., Frost, K., Hillis, V., Mathew, S., Newton, E. K., Naar, N., Newson, L., et al. (2016) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x1400106x · Cited by 639
Self-citationThe Origins and Psychology of Human Cooperation
Henrich, J., & Muthukrishna, M. (2021) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev-psych-081920-042106 · Cited by 457
“Finally, theoretical work shows that adding social norms, which allow third parties to adjudicate disagreements about who did what during unsuccessful interactions,can dramatically increase the range of conditions under which direct reciprocity can emerge (Mathew et al. 2013).”
BackgroundArbitration supports reciprocity when there are frequent perception errors
Boyd, R. T., & Mathew, S. (2021) · Nature Human Behaviour · doi:10.1038/s41562-020-01008-1 · Cited by 28
Self-citationIn search of animal normativity: a framework for studying social norms in non‐human animals
Westra, E., Fitzpatrick, S., Brosnan, S. F., Gruber, T., Hobaiter, C., Hopper, L. M., Kelly, D., Krupenye, C., Luncz, L. V., Theriault, J. E., et al. (2024) · Biological reviews/Biological reviews of the Cambridge Philosophical Society · doi:10.1111/brv.13056 · Cited by 45
“Boyd & Richerson, 1992; Mathew, Boyd & van Veelen, 2013).”
Silk, J. B. (2013) · Current Biology · doi:10.1016/j.cub.2013.03.052 · Cited by 23
Hunter–Gatherer population structure and the evolution of contingent cooperation
Boyd, R. T., Schonmann, R. H., & Vicente, R. (2014) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2014.02.002 · Cited by 20
Self-citationThird-party monitoring and sanctions aid the evolution of language
Boyd, R. T., & Mathew, S. (2015) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2015.06.002 · Cited by 18
“…cooperation, and that some other factor must have catalyzed the highly coope-rativetrajectoryofhumans,suchasculture(Boyd,Richerson,&Henrich, 2011; Mathew, Boyd, & van Veelen, 2013), intelligence (Pinker, 2010), theory of mind (Tomasello & Carpenter, 2007; van Schaik & Burkart, 2010), a dietary…”
BackgroundSelf-citationCultural group selection follows Darwin's classic syllogism for the operation of selection
Richerson, P. J., Baldini, R., Bell, A. V., Demps, K., Frost, K., Hillis, V., Mathew, S., Newton, E. K., Naar, N., Newson, L., et al. (2016) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x15000606 · Cited by 18
Self-citationThe evolution of morality and the role of commitment
Akdeniz, A., & van Veelen, M. (2021) · Evolutionary Human Sciences · doi:10.1017/ehs.2021.36 · Cited by 18
Self-citationHow evolved psychological mechanisms empower cultural group selection
Henrich, J., & Boyd, R. T. (2016) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x15000138 · Cited by 12
Self-citationSilly Rules Improve the Capacity of Agents to Learn Stable Enforcement and Compliance Behaviors
Koster, R., Hadfield-Menell, D., Hadfield, G. K., & Leibo, J. Z. (2020) · Adaptive Agents and Multi-Agents Systems · doi:10.65109/qhud6811 · Cited by 10
“expulsion from a group or physical violence [48, 3], may be essential for many aspects of human intelligence, from small-scale kin-based cooperation [32] to managing local natural resources [37], and even the emergence of language [6].”
BackgroundBetween Kin Selection and Cultural Relativism: Cultural Evolution and the Origin of Inequality
Lynch, W. T. (2019) · Perspectives on Science · doi:10.1162/posc_a_00308 · Cited by 5
Extraordinary siblings: Mole rats, marmosets, and Radcliffe-Brown
Jones, D. (2025) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0319385 · Cited by 1
“And the same “glue” – interlocking identities, roles, norms, and scripts – that holds together large-scale impersonal organizations is also at work on smaller scales [35].”
Human–AI social cooperation: convergences, divergences, and challenges
Yao, S., Shan, J., Hu, L., & lu, X. (2025) · Chinese Science Bulletin (Chinese Version) · doi:10.1360/csb-2025-0662 · Cited by 1
When it pays to punish in the evolution of honesty and cooperation
Rubin, H. (2022) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-022-03743-6 · Cited by 1
“While third party punishment may have been important in many evolutionary scenarios (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004; Mathew et al., 2013; Chavez & Bicchieri, 2013) the third party monitoring and reputation tracking assumed in this model take us quite far from the cases of interest arising from…”
BackgroundPunishment and Human Sociality
Dearing, A. (2017) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-45048-3_2
BREVE ESTUDO INTERDISCIPLINAR ACERCA DA EVOLUÇÃO, ONTOGENIA E COGNIÇÃO DO COMPORTAMENTO RITUAL
Silva, T. M. M., & dos Santos, L. S. (2018) · CSOnline - REVISTA ELETRÔNICA DE CIÊNCIAS SOCIAIS · doi:10.34019/1981-2140.2017.17440
The Evolution of MoralityPreprint
van Veelen, M. (2020) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3697501
Self-citation(2015) · Elsevier eBooks · doi:10.1016/b978-0-12-397937-7.16001-x
Zerbe, J. G. (2019) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-16999-6_418-1
Zerbe, J. G. (2021) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-19650-3_418
Isufi, S., Poje, K., Vukobratovic, I., & Brčić, M. (2022) · Philosophies · doi:10.3390/philosophies7060134 · Cited by 1
Muwaffaq, T., Sabbah, S., & Pratiwi, A. (2024) · Prosiding Seminar Nasional Pemberdayaan Masyarakat (SENDAMAS) · doi:10.36722/psn.v3i1.2546
“Norma dan aturan institusional mengelola kooperativitas secara lebih efektif berbanding aksi yang berbalas-balasan atau resiprokal sehingga mengevolusikan kerjasama antar individu [16].”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Mathew, S., Boyd, R., & Van Veelen, M.
- Venue
- Cultural Evolution
- Publisher
- The MIT Press
- Published
- 2013-11-22
- Pages
- 45-60
- OpenAlex
- W2496097291
- Cited by
- 23
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2025: 2 · 2024: 2 · 2022: 2 · 2021: 3 · 2020: 3 · 2019: 2 · 2018: 1 · 2017: 1 · 2016: 2 · 2015: 2 · 2014: 2 · 2013: 1
- FWCI
- 14.73
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- The MIT Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Evolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior
- Keywords
- human cooperation, kin selection, direct reciprocity, third-party enforcement, social norms, large-scale cooperation, life history
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