The DOI matches its OpenAlex record; 12 of the 12 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Role of Demandable Debt in Structuring Optimal Banking Arrangements
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Citations
Cites
The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism
Akerlof, G. A. (1970) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1879431 · Cited by 23,016
Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity
Diamond, D. W., & Dybvig, P. H. (1983) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261155 · Cited by 9,369
Financial intermediation and delegated monitoring
Diamond, D. W. (1984) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297430 · Cited by 8,476
On the impossibility of informationally efficient markets
Stiglitz, J. E., & Grossman, S. J. (1980) · Columbia University · doi:10.7916/d8765r99 · Cited by 3,645
Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification
Townsend, R. M. (1979) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(79)90031-0 · Cited by 3,204
A model of reserves, bank runs, and deposit insurance
Bryant, J. (1980) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/0378-4266(80)90012-6 · Cited by 1,061
Distinguishing Panics and Information-based Bank Runs: Welfare and Policy Implications
Jacklin, C. J., & Bhattacharya, S. (1988) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261552 · Cited by 709
Banking Panics, Information, and Rational Expectations Equilibrium
CHARI, V. V., & JAGANNATHAN, R. (1988) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1988.tb04606.x · Cited by 708
The Origins of Banking Panics: Models, Facts, and Bank Regulation
Calomiris, C. W., & Gorton, G. (1991) · NBER Chapters · Cited by 584
Self-citationThe Competitive Supply of Money
Klein, B. (1974) · Journal of Money, Credit and Banking · doi:10.2307/1991457 · Cited by 303
Demand deposit contracts, suspension of convertibility, and optimal financial intermediation
Villamil, A. P. (1991) · Economic Theory · doi:10.1007/bf01210565 · Cited by 23
Optimal contingent bank liquidation under moral hazardPreprint
Calomiris, C. W., Kahn, C. M., & Krasa, S. (1991) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 16
Self-citation
Cited by
Finance and Growth: Theory and Evidence
Levine, R. (2004) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w10766 · Cited by 3,545
Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch 2007–2008
Brunnermeier, M. K. (2009) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.23.1.77 · Cited by 3,322
Chapter 12 Finance and Growth: Theory and Evidence
Levine, R. (2005) · Handbook of Economic Growth · doi:10.1016/s1574-0684(05)01012-9 · Cited by 2,889
Liberalization, Moral Hazard in Banking, and Prudential Regulation: Are Capital Requirements Enough?
Hellmann, T. F., Murdock, K. C., & Stiglitz, J. E. (2000) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.90.1.147 · Cited by 2,088
Liquidity Risk, Liquidity Creation, and Financial Fragility: A Theory of Banking
Diamond, D. W., & Rajan, R. G. (2001) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/319552 · Cited by 2,002
Metadata
- Authors
- Calomiris, C. W., & Kahn, C. M.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 1991-01-01
- Volume
- 81
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 497-513
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1545420549
- Cited by
- 1,470
- References
- 12
- FWCI
- 20.10
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.