The Epistemic Condition of Moral Responsibility
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Abstract
In this chapter I will canvas the central positions in debates about the epistemic condition of moral responsibility. In so doing, I will discuss some of the core theoretical and applied questions that concern the impact ignorance has on moral responsibility. My first task is to outline the structure of the epistemic condition and describe how the foreseeability of ignorance and ignorant wrongdoing is relevant to the question of whether the epistemic condition is met. I then go on to describe two of the main strands in the debate. I will then delve into two main perspectives on the topic: "volitionism," which posits that must trace to an instance of knowing or witting belief mismanagement, and "non-volitionism," which does not have this requirement and is therefore less restrictive in determining moral responsibility for ignorant actions. I will also examine the relevance of moral ignorance, difficulty, praiseworthiness, and luck to the epistemic condition. I conclude with a discussion of some issues in what might be called the applied ethics of the epistemic condition.
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Cited by
Coeckelbergh, M. (2020) · Science and Engineering Ethics · doi:10.1007/s11948-019-00146-8 · Cited by 475
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Baum, K., Mantel, S., Schmidt, E., & Speith, T. (2022) · Philosophy & Technology · doi:10.1007/s13347-022-00510-w · Cited by 103
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Coeckelbergh, M. (2023) · AI & SOCIETY · doi:10.1007/s00146-021-01375-x · Cited by 81
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Metadata
- Authors
- Robichaud, P.
- Venue
- A Companion to Free Will
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2023-06-12
- Pages
- 355-368
- OpenAlex
- W4380482321
- Cited by
- 107
- References
- 0
- Type
- other
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
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