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The Epistemic Condition of Moral Responsibility

Open access
Robichaud, Philip · 2023 · A Companion to Free Will
Cited by 107

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Abstract

In this chapter I will canvas the central positions in debates about the epistemic condition of moral responsibility. In so doing, I will discuss some of the core theoretical and applied questions that concern the impact ignorance has on moral responsibility. My first task is to outline the structure of the epistemic condition and describe how the foreseeability of ignorance and ignorant wrongdoing is relevant to the question of whether the epistemic condition is met. I then go on to describe two of the main strands in the debate. I will then delve into two main perspectives on the topic: "volitionism," which posits that must trace to an instance of knowing or witting belief mismanagement, and "non-volitionism," which does not have this requirement and is therefore less restrictive in determining moral responsibility for ignorant actions. I will also examine the relevance of moral ignorance, difficulty, praiseworthiness, and luck to the epistemic condition. I conclude with a discussion of some issues in what might be called the applied ethics of the epistemic condition.

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Research works printed but not linked: 40

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Metadata

Authors
Robichaud, P.
Venue
A Companion to Free Will
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2023-06-12
Pages
355-368
OpenAlex
W4380482321
Cited by
107
References
0
Type
other
Language
en
Open access
gold

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: The Epistemic Condition of Moral Responsibility. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1002/9781119210177.ch21
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Robichaud, P. (2023). The Epistemic Condition of Moral Responsibility. A Companion to Free Will. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119210177.ch21

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.