The DOI matches its Crossref record; 6 of the 6 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Unprincipled Virtue: An Inquiry Into Moral Agency
Abstract
This book presents a positive theory of moral worth. Chapter 1 examines the complexities of moral life that appear to differ from the paradigmatic cases of moral psychology. Chapter 2 argues against the common assumption that akrasia is always irrational, or at least, always less rational than the corresponding self-controlled action. The theory is presented in Chapter 3 — that people are praiseworthy for acts of good will and blameworthy for acts of ill will or absence of good will, and the amount of praise or blame they deserve varies with the depth of their motivation or extent of their indifference. Chapter 4 and 5 defend this theory against potential objections to the effect that there is something wrong with its failure to invoke autonomy, and clarifies the theory’s implications about some issues in moral responsibility often associated with autonomy (i.e., responsibility of kleptomaniacs, drug addicts, makers of Freudian slips, and persons driven to murder by hypnotists).
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Cites
Telling more than we can know: Verbal reports on mental processes.
Nisbett, R. E., & Wilson, T. D. (1977) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.84.3.231 · Cited by 11,317
Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person
Frankfurt, H. G. (1971) · The Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.2307/2024717 · Cited by 4,663
The Importance of What We Care About: Philosophical Essays
Frankfurt, H. G. (1988) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511818172 · Cited by 2,634
Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility
Fischer, J. M., & Ravizza, M. (1998) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511814594 · Cited by 2,249
Faces of Intention: Selected Essays on Intention and Agency
Bratman, M. E. (1999) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511625190 · Cited by 1,496
Persons, Situations, and Virtue Ethics
Doris, J. M. (1998) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/0029-4624.00136 · Cited by 731
Cited by
Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing
Fricker, M. (2007) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198237907.001.0001 · Cited by 9,198
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Bhargava, V. R., & Velasquez, M. (2021) · Business Ethics Quarterly · doi:10.1017/beq.2020.32 · Cited by 292
Beyond accuracy: Epistemic flaws with statistical generalizations
Munton, J. (2019) · Philosophical Issues · doi:10.1111/phis.12150 · Cited by 110
Agency, Teleological Control and Robust Causation
Usher, M. (2020) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.1111/phpr.12537 · Cited by 29
Against willing servitude: Autonomy in the ethics of advanced artificial intelligence
Bales, A. (2025) · The Philosophical Quarterly · doi:10.1093/pq/pqaf031 · Cited by 7
Metadata
- Authors
- Arpaly, N.
- Publisher
- Oxford University PressNew York
- Published
- 2002-12-19
- OpenAlex
- W4240610838
- Cited by
- 205
- References
- 6
- FWCI
- 6.46
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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