Psychological conceptions of randomness
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This article presents a critique of the concept of randomness as it occurs in the psychological literature. The first section of our article outlines the significance of a concept of randomness to the process of induction; we need to distinguish random and non‐random events in order to perceive lawful regularities and formulate theories concerning events in the world. Next we evaluate the psychological research that has suggested that human concepts of randomness are not normative. We argue that, because the tasks set to experimental subjects are logically problematic, observed biases may be an artifact of the experimental situation and that even if such biases do generalise they may not have pejorative implications for induction in the real world. Thirdly we investigate the statistical methodology utilised in tests for randomness and find it riddled with paradox. In a fourth section we find various branches of scientific endeavour that are stymied by the problems posed by randomness. Finally we briefly mention the social significance of randomness and conclude by arguing that such a fundamental concept merits and requires more serious considerations.
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Citations
Cites
Belief in the law of small numbers.
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1971) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/h0031322 · Cited by 3,246
The Hot Hand in Basketball: On the Misperception of Random Sequences
Gilovich, T., Vallone, R., & Tversky, A. (1985) · Cognitive Psychology · doi:10.1016/0010-0285(85)90010-6 · Cited by 1,649
The serial test for sampling numbers and other tests for randomness
Good, I. J. (1953) · Mathematical Proceedings of the Cambridge Philosophical Society · doi:10.1017/s030500410002836x · Cited by 115
Cited by
The hot hand fallacy and the gambler’s fallacy: Two faces of subjective randomness?
Ayton, P., & Fischer, I. (2004) · Memory & Cognition · doi:10.3758/bf03206327 · Cited by 471
Self-citationBar-Hillel, M., & Wagenaar, W. A. (1991) · Advances in Applied Mathematics · doi:10.1016/0196-8858(91)90029-i · Cited by 400
Cognitive biases and decision support systems development: a design science approach
Arnott, D. (2006) · Information Systems Journal · doi:10.1111/j.1365-2575.2006.00208.x · Cited by 354
Making sense of randomness: Implicit encoding as a basis for judgment.
Falk, R., & Konold, C. (1997) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037//0033-295x.104.2.301 · Cited by 280
Probability matching as a computational strategy used in perception
Wozny, D. R., Beierholm, U. R., & Shams, L. (2010) · PLoS Computational Biology · doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000871 · Cited by 265
What's next? Judging sequences of binary events.
Oskarsson, A. T., Van Boven, L., McClelland, G. H., & Hastie, R. (2009) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/a0014821 · Cited by 253
The production and perception of randomness
Nickerson, R. S. (2002) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.109.2.330 · Cited by 247
The smart potential behind probability matching
Gaissmaier, W., & Schooler, L. J. (2008) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2008.09.007 · Cited by 223
Metadata
- Authors
- Ayton, P., Hunt, A. J., & Wright, G.
- Venue
- Journal of Behavioral Decision Making
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1989-10
- Volume
- 2
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 221-238
- ISSN
- 0894-3257 (ISSN-L)
- 1099-0771
- OpenAlex
- W2027549837
- Cited by
- 75
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 1.20
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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