The DOI matches its Crossref record; 15 of the 15 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Lay rationalism and inconsistency between predicted experience and decision
Open accessAbstract
Decision‐makers are sometimes depicted as impulsive and overly influenced by ‘hot’, affective factors. The present research suggests that decision‐makers may be too ‘cold’ and overly focus on rationalistic attributes, such as economic values, quantitative specifications, and functions. In support of this proposition, we find a systematic inconsistency between predicted experience and decision. That is, people are more likely to favor a rationalistically‐superior option when they make a decision than when they predict experience. We discuss how this work contributes to research on predicted and decision utilities; we also discuss when decision‐makers overweight hot factors and when they overweight cold factors. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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Cited by
Why do humans reason? Arguments for an argumentative theory
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What Do You Think Would Make You Happier? What Do You Think You Would Choose?
Benjamin, D. J., Heffetz, O., Kimball, M. S., & Rees-Jones, A. (2012) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.102.5.2083 · Cited by 402
Metadata
- Authors
- Hsee, C. K., Zhang, J., Yu, F., & Xi, Y.
- Venue
- Journal of Behavioral Decision Making
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2003-07-21
- Volume
- 16
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 257-272
- ISSN
- 0894-3257 (ISSN-L)
- 1099-0771
- OpenAlex
- W2125109428
- Cited by
- 169
- References
- 15
- FWCI
- 7.44
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.