The DOI matches its Crossref record; 12 of the 12 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
1 The Fundamental Agency Problem and Its Mitigation: Independence, Equity, and the Market for Corporate Control
Abstract
A central tenet of agency theory is that there is potential for mischief when the interests of owners and managers diverge. In those circumstances, and for a variety of reasons, managers may be able to exact higher rents than are reasonable or than the owners of the firm would otherwise accord them. While that foundational element of agency theory is secure, other elements derived directly from agency theory are far less settled. Indeed, even after some 75 years of conceptualization and empirical research, the three principal approaches that have long been proposed to mitigate the fundamental agency problem remain contentious. Accordingly, we provide a review of the fundamental agency problem and its mitigation through independence, equity, and the market for corporate control.
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Cites
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Substitutes or Complements? A Configurational Examination of Corporate Governance Mechanisms
Misangyi, V. F., & Acharya, A. G. (2014) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.5465/amj.2012.0728 · Cited by 771
Composition and Activity of the Board of Directors: Impact on ESG Performance in the Banking System
Birindelli, G., Dell’Atti, S., Iannuzzi, A. P., & Savioli, M. (2018) · Sustainability · doi:10.3390/su10124699 · Cited by 459
Wijen, F. (2014) · Academy of Management Review · doi:10.5465/amr.2012.0218 · Cited by 459
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Parmigiani, A., & Rivera-Santos, M. (2011) · Journal of Management · doi:10.1177/0149206311407507 · Cited by 448
Metadata
- Authors
- Dalton, D. R., Hitt, M. A., Certo, S. T., & Dalton, C. M.
- Venue
- The Academy of Management Annals
- Publisher
- Academy of Management
- Published
- 2007-12
- Volume
- 1
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 1-64
- ISSN
- 1941-6067 (ISSN-L)
- 1941-6520
- OpenAlex
- W4206222289
- Cited by
- 843
- References
- 12
- FWCI
- 38.72
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Dalton, D. R., Hitt, M. A., Certo, S. T., & Dalton, C. M. (2007). 1 The Fundamental Agency Problem and Its Mitigation: Independence, Equity, and the Market for Corporate Control. The Academy of Management Annals. https://doi.org/10.1080/078559806
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
