The DOI matches its Crossref record; 47 of the 47 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Chief executive compensation: A synthesis and reconciliation
Abstract
Chief executive (CEO) compensation is a potent instrument through which theorists can improve their understanding of organization substance and symbol. This paper reviews and integrates the literature on CEO compensation, focusing on both determinants and consequences of this complex, often controversial phenomenon. The central thesis is that CEO pay is at once both more and less ‘sensible’ than its critics and architects, respectively, contend. Comprehending CEO compensation, whether for purposes of description or prescription, requires the use of multiple perspectives—economic, political, social, and individual.
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Cites
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Cited by
Executive compensation structure, ownership, and firm performance
Mehran, H. (1995) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(94)00809-f · Cited by 2,086
Pay without performance: the unfulfilled promise of executive compensation
(2005) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.42-4735 · Cited by 1,936
Carpenter, M. A., & Westphal, J. D. (2001) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.2307/3069408 · Cited by 1,312
COLLABORATION IN THE BOARDROOM: BEHAVIORAL AND PERFORMANCE CONSEQUENCES OF CEO-BOARD SOCIAL TIES.
Westphal, J. D. (1999) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.2307/256871 · Cited by 1,208
On the Efficiency of Internal and External Corporate Control Mechanisms
Walsh, J. P., & Seward, J. K. (1990) · Academy of Management Review · doi:10.5465/amr.1990.4308826 · Cited by 1,017
Metadata
- Authors
- Finkelstein, S., & Hambrick, D. C.
- Venue
- Strategic Management Journal
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1988-11
- Volume
- 9
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 543-558
- ISSN
- 0143-2095 (ISSN-L)
- 1097-0266
- OpenAlex
- W2114491221
- Cited by
- 336
- References
- 47
- FWCI
- 11.69
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.