The DOI matches its Crossref record; 26 of the 26 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Ceo selection, succession, compensation and firm performance: A theoretical integration and empirical analysis
Abstract
This study seeks to extend and unify a set of research issues relating to CEO selection, succession, compensation, and firm performance. The study offers a model of these issues from a combined agency and organizational perspective, and tests the model using archival data and perceptual data from survey responses from 118 CEOs of the largest U.S. corporations. The results suggest that several CEO issues are significant predictors of variation in firm performance, supporting the paper's arguments for (1) a reinterpretation of the insiderfoutsider CEO distinction, (2) the relevance of CEO succession planning, and (3) the importance of CEOs' perceptions of the linkage between their personal wealth and firm wealth.
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Citations
Cites
Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(76)90026-x · Cited by 71,491
Separation of Ownership and Control
Fama, E. F., & Jensen, M. C. (1983) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/467037 · Cited by 19,058
Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm
Fama, E. F. (1980) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260866 · Cited by 10,466
Upper Echelons: The Organization as a Reflection of Its Top Managers
Hambrick, D. C., & Mason, P. A. (1984) · The Academy of Management Review · doi:10.5465/amr.1984.4277628 · Cited by 10,220
Educational Organizations as Loosely Coupled Systems
Weick, K. E. (1976) · Administrative Science Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2391875 · Cited by 5,142
Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective
Holmstrom, B. (1999) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/1467-937x.00083 · Cited by 3,172
Corporate performance and managerial remuneration
Murphy, K. J. (1985) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/0165-4101(85)90026-6 · Cited by 1,755
Executive compensation, management turnover, and firm performance
Coughlan, A. T., & Schmidt, R. M. (1985) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/0165-4101(85)90027-8 · Cited by 1,209
The Structure within Industries and Companies' Performance
Porter, M. E. (1979) · The Review of Economics and Statistics · doi:10.2307/1924589 · Cited by 902
External control, corporate strategy, and firm performance in research‐intensive industries
Hill, C. W. L., & Snell, S. A. (1988) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.4250090605 · Cited by 794
Cited by
How Much Does Performance Matter? A Meta-Analysis of CEO Pay Studies
Tosi, H. L., Werner, S., Katz, J. P., & Gomez-Mejia, L. R. (2000) · Journal of Management · doi:10.1177/014920630002600207 · Cited by 979
Pettigrew, A. M. (1992) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.4250130911 · Cited by 840
Board control and ceo compensation
Boyd, B. K. (1994) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.4250150502 · Cited by 820
BOARD CONTROL, REMUNERATION COMMITTEES, AND TOP MANAGEMENT COMPENSATION.
Conyon, M. J., & Peck, S. I. (1998) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.2307/257099 · Cited by 734
Shen, W., & Cannella, A. A. (2002) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.2307/3069306 · Cited by 639
Metadata
- Authors
- Zajac, E. J.
- Venue
- Strategic Management Journal
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1990-03
- Volume
- 11
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 217-230
- ISSN
- 0143-2095 (ISSN-L)
- 1097-0266
- OpenAlex
- W2125873483
- Cited by
- 436
- References
- 26
- FWCI
- 16.91
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.