The DOI matches its Crossref record; 43 of the 43 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Board control and ceo compensation
Abstract
The board of directors has been identified as a key internal control mechanism for setting CEO compensation. Theory suggests that CEOs will attempt to circumvent board control in an effort to maximize salary. This hypothesis was tested using a sample of 193 firms in a cross‐section of industries. Corporate governance literature was reviewed to develop a multiple indicator measure of board control. Although, as hypothesized, CEO salaries were greater in firms with lower levels of control, CEO compensation was not significantly related to firm size or profitability.
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Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance
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Metadata
- Authors
- Boyd, B. K.
- Venue
- Strategic Management Journal
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1994-06
- Volume
- 15
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 335-344
- ISSN
- 0143-2095 (ISSN-L)
- 1097-0266
- OpenAlex
- W2068123771
- Cited by
- 820
- References
- 43
- FWCI
- 30.40
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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