Board control and ceo compensation
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 43 of the 43 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
The board of directors has been identified as a key internal control mechanism for setting CEO compensation. Theory suggests that CEOs will attempt to circumvent board control in an effort to maximize salary. This hypothesis was tested using a sample of 193 firms in a cross‐section of industries. Corporate governance literature was reviewed to develop a multiple indicator measure of board control. Although, as hypothesized, CEO salaries were greater in firms with lower levels of control, CEO compensation was not significantly related to firm size or profitability.
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“If the roles of CEO and chair are separate, there may be more objective assessment of the performance of the CEO (Boyd, 1994).”
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“The agency theory first appeared in economics research and has since spread to areas such as accounting and organizational management (Nyberg et al., 2010; Boyd, 1994; Cerbioni and Parbonetti, 2007).”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Boyd, B. K.
- Venue
- Strategic Management Journal
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1994-06
- Volume
- 15
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 335-344
- ISSN
- 0143-2095 (ISSN-L)
- 1097-0266
- OpenAlex
- W2068123771
- Cited by
- 820
- References
- 43
- FWCI
- 30.40
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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