CoChat
Sign Up
Cited by 1,093Corporate Social Responsibility ReportingEnvironmental Sustainability in BusinessPolitical Influence and Corporate Strategies

Responding to public and private politics: corporate disclosure of climate change strategies

Open access
Reid, Erin M., Toffel, Michael W.·2009·Strategic Management Journal
DOI 10.1002/smj.796
Open this paper in CoChat — free account

Abstract

The challenges associated with climate change will require governments, citizens, and firms to work collaboratively to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, a task that requires information on companies' carbon risks, opportunities, strategies, and emission levels. This paper explores the conditions under which firms participate in this endeavor. Building on theories of how social activists inspire changes in organizational norms, beliefs, and practices, we hypothesize that shareholder actions and regulatory threats are likely to prime firms to adopt practices consistent with the aims of a broader social movement. We find empirical evidence of direct and spillover effects. In the domain of private politics, shareholder resolutions filed against a firm and others in its industry increase a firm's propensity to engage in practices consistent with the aims of the related social movement. Similarly, in the realm of public politics, threats of state regulations targeted at a firm's industry as well as regulations targeted at other industries increase the likelihood that the firm will engage in such practices. These findings extend existing theory by showing that both activist groups and government actors can spur changes in organizational practices, and that challenges mounted against a single firm or a single industry can inspire both firm and field‐level changes. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1002/smj.796

Cites

4 of 4 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Claims the paper makes

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Claims other papers make about this one

Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?

  • Organizations whose operations pose a greater risk to the environment are more likely to be heavily regulated and scrutinized by the state and will thus establish sophisticated reporting structures.

    “organizations whose operations pose a greater risk to the environment are more likely to be heavily regulated and scrutinized by the state (Bansal and Roth, 2000;Reid and Toffel, 2009;Chatterji and Toffel, 2010) and will thus establish sophisticated reporting structures and processes aimed at increasing the transparency of their operations and impacts (Lyon and Maxwell, 2011).”

    From Strategic Silence: Withholding Certification Status as a Hypocrisy Avoidance Tactic (2018) · cites this paper as Reid and Toffel, 2009

    The 'Extension: Environmentally sensitive industries' section (p. 26) describes firms in those industries as facing a heightened threat of regulatory scrutiny. That supports the scrutiny portion of the clause attributed to Reid and Toffel, but a threat of scrutiny does not establish that these firms are more likely to be heavily regulated. The later claim about reporting structures is attached to a different citation. (LLM, conf=0.83)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

  • Lagging all independent and moderating variables by one year avoids concerns about simultaneity or reverse causality.

    “To avoid concerns about simultaneity or reverse causality, we lagged all independent and moderating variables by one year (Reid and Toffel, 2009;Lewis, Walls, and Dowell, 2014).”

    From Strategic Silence: Withholding Certification Status as a Hypocrisy Avoidance Tactic (2018) · cites this paper as Reid and Toffel, 2009

    The Model specification (p. 21) says the authors lagged independent variables to avoid simultaneity concerns, but expressly identifies two exceptions to the one-year lag: shareholder action and toxic chemical emissions. It does not separately say that this procedure eliminates reverse-causality concerns or specify that all moderating variables were lagged one year. (LLM, conf=0.90)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

  • Shareholder resolutions are proposals often put forth by socially minded investors who seek to influence corporate decision makers by generating internal debates about a firm's policies and practices.

    “Shareholder resolutions are proposals often put forth by socially minded investors who seek to influence corporate decision makers by generating internal debates about a firm's policies and practices (Reid and Toffel, 2009).”

    From Strategic Silence: Withholding Certification Status as a Hypocrisy Avoidance Tactic (2018) · cites this paper as Reid and Toffel, 2009

  • Company size is positively correlated with the likelihood of environmental disclosure and the number of prosocial claims made by a firm.

    “prior research has found company size to be positively correlated with the likelihood of environmental disclosure (Reid and Toffel, 2009;Lewis, Walls, and Dowell, 2014) and, more generally, the number of prosocial claims made by a firm (McDonnell and King, 2013)”

    From Strategic Silence: Withholding Certification Status as a Hypocrisy Avoidance Tactic (2018) · cites this paper as Reid and Toffel, 2009

  • CSR reporting can be used to proactively abate societal pressure.

    “In this context, CSR reporting (and, of course, the underlying CSR activities) can be used to proactively abate societal pressure (e.g., Reid and Toffel 2009), reduce the risk of harmful regulatory actions (Hillman and Keim 2001), promote corporate goodwill, explain the sustainability of firm strategies, and pander to special interest groups (e.g., activists, customers).”

    From Mandatory CSR and sustainability reporting: economic analysis and literature review (2021) · cites this paper as Reid and Toffel 2009

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

The self-check needs the paper’s full text.

Cites

Flagged first, then by citations

Research works printed but not linked: 68

  1. Allison PD. 1999. Comparing logit and probit coefficients across groups. SMR/Sociological Methods & Research 28 (2): 186-208.
  2. Bailey KM. 2004. Citizen participation in environmental enforcement in Mexico and the United States: A Comparative Study. Georgetown International Environmental Review Winter.
  3. Baron DP. 2003. Private politics. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 12 (1): 31-66.
  4. Baron DP, Diermeier D. 2007. Strategic activism and non-market strategy. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 16 (3): 599-634.
  5. Bertels S, Peloza, J. 2008. Running just to stand still? Managing CSR reputation in an era of ratcheting expectations. Corporate Reputation Review 11 : 56-72.
  6. Buysse K, Verbeke A. 2003. Proactive environmental strategies: A stakeholder management perspective. Strategic Management Journal 24 (5): 453-470.
  7. Dalton, RJ, Recchia S, Rohrschneider R. 2003. The environmental movement and the modes of political action. Comparative Political Studies 36 (7): 743-771.
  8. David P, Bloom M, Hillman AJ. 2007. Investor activism, managerial responsiveness and corporate social performance. Strategic Management Journal 28 : 91-100.
  9. Davis GF, McAdam D, Scott WR, Zald MN (eds.). 2005. Social Movements and Organization Theory . Cambridge University Press: New York.
  10. Davis GF, Thompson TA. 1994. A social movement perspective on corporate control. Administrative Science Quarterly 39 : 141-173.
  11. Deegan C, Gordon B. 1996. A study of the environmental disclosure practices of Australian corporations. Accounting and Business Research 26 (3): 187-199.
  12. Della Porta D, Diani M. 2006. Social Movements: An Introduction, Second Edition. Blackwell Publishing: Malden, MA .
  13. Delmas MA, Toffel MW. 2008. Organizational responses to environmental demands: Opening the black box. Strategic Management Journal 29 (10): 1027-1055.
  14. Den Hond F, de Bakker FGA. 2007. Ideologically motivated activism: How activist groups influence corporate social change activities. Academy of Management Review 32 (3): 901924.
  15. DiMaggio PJ, Powell WW. 1983. The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields. American Sociological Review 48 : 147-160.
  16. Eesley C, Lenox MJ. 2006. Firm responses to secondary stakeholder action. Strategic Management Journal 27 : 765-781.
  17. Fineman S, Clarke K. 1996. Green stakeholders: Industry interpretations and response. Journal of Management Studies 33 : 715-729.
  18. Friedman M. 1999. Consumer Boycotts: Effecting Change through the Marketplace and the Media . Routledge: New York.
  19. Gillan SL, Starks LT. 2000. Corporate governance proposals and shareholder activism: The role of institutional investors. Journal of Financial Economics 57 : 275-305.
  20. Gillan SL, Starks LT. 2007. The evolution of shareholder activism in the United States. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 19 (1): 55-73.
  21. Goins S, Gruca T. 2008. Understanding competitive and contagion effects of layoff announcements. Corporate Reputation Review 11 : 12-34.
  22. Greenwood R, Suddaby R, Hinings CR. 2002. Theorizing change: The role of professional associations in the transformation of institutionalized fields. Academy of Management Journal 45 : 58-80.
  23. Hackston D, Milne MJ. 1996. Some determinants of social and environmental disclosures in New Zealand companies. Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal 9 (1): 77-108.
  24. Hoetker G. 2007. The use of logit and probit models in strategic management research: Critical issues. Strategic Management Journal 28 (4): 331-343.
  25. Hoffman AJ. 1996. A strategic response to investor activism. Sloan Management Review 37 (2): 51-64.
  26. Hoffman AJ. 1999. Institutional evolution and change: Environmentalism and the U.S. chemical industry. Academy of Management Journal 42 : 351-371.
  27. Ingram P, Rao H. 2004. Store wars: The enactment and repeal of anti-chain-store legislation in America. American Journal of Sociology 110 (2): 446-487.
  28. Jeswani HK, Wehrmeyer W, Mulugetta Y. 2008. How warm is the corporate response to climate change? Evidence from Pakistan and the UK. Business Strategy and the Environment 17 (1): 46-60.
  29. Jones TM. 1995. Instrumental stakeholder theory: A synthesis of ethics and economics. Academy of Management Review 20 : 404-442.
  30. Kalev A, Dobbin F, Kelly E. 2006. Best practices or best guesses? Diversity management and the remediation of inequality. American Sociological Review 71 : 589-917.
  31. Karpoff JM. 2001. The impact of shareholder activism on target companies: A survey of empirical findings. Working paper, Michael G. Foster School of Business, University of Washington, Seattle, WA. http://ssrn.com/abstract=885365 (16 July 2008).
  32. King AA, Lenox, MJ. 2000. Industry self-regulation without sanctions: The chemical industry's Responsible Care program. Academy of Management Journal 43 (4): 698-716.
  33. King AA, Toffel MW. Forthcoming. Self-regulatory institutions for solving environmental problems: Perspectives and contributions from the management literature. In New Perspectives in Governance for Sustainable Development, Delmas M, Young O (eds.). Cambridge University Press.
  34. King BG. 2008. A political mediation model of corporate response to social movement activism. Administrative Science Quarterly 53 (3): 395-421.
  35. King BG. 2008. A social movement perspective of stakeholder collective action and influence. Business & Society 47 (1): 21-49.
  36. King BG, Soule SA. 2007. Social movements as extra-institutional entrepreneurs: The effect of protest on stock price returns. Administrative Science Quarterly 52 : 413-442.
  37. King M, Haveman H. 2008. Antislavery in America: The press, the pulpit, and the rise of antislavery societies. Administrative Science Quarterly 53 (3): 492-528.
  38. Kolk A. 2008. Sustainability, accountability and corporate governance: Exploring multinationals' reporting practices. Business Strategy and the Environment 17 (1): 1-15.
  39. Kolk A, Pinkse J. 2007. Multinationals' political activities on climate change. Business & Society 46 (2): 201-228.
  40. Lash J, Wellington F. 2007. Competitive advantage on a warming planet. Harvard Business Review , March.
  41. Lenox MJ, Eesley CE. 2009. Private environmental activism and the selection and response of firm targets. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 18 (1): 45-73.
  42. Lounsbury M, Ventresca MJ, Hirsch, PM. 2003. Social movements, field frames and industry emergence: A cultural-political perspective on U.S. recycling. Socio-Economic Review 1 (1): 71-104.
  43. Lyon TP, Maxwell JW. 2002. Voluntary approaches to environmental regulation: A survey. In Economic Institutions and Environmental Policy, Franzini M, Nicita A (eds.). Ashgate Publishing: Burlington, VT.
  44. Marquis C, Glynn MA, Davis GF. 2007. Community isomorphism and corporate social action. Academy of Management Review 32 (3): 925-945.
  45. Maxwell JW, Lyon TP, Hackett SC. 2000. Self-regulation and social welfare: The political economy of corporate environmentalism. Journal of Law and Economics 43 (2): 583-618.
  46. McAdam D. 1982. Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970. University of Chicago Press: Chicago, IL.
  47. McAdam D, Scott WR. 2005. Organizations and movements. In Social Movements and Organization Theory , Davis GF, McAdam D, Scott WR, Zald MN (eds.). Cambridge University Press: New York: 4-40.
  48. Meyer M. 2004. Organizational identity, political contexts and SMO action: Explaining the tactical choices made by peace organizations in Israel, Northern Ireland, and South Africa. Social Movement Studies 3 (2): 167-197.
  49. Meyer DS, Minkoff DC. 2004. Conceptualizing political opportunity. Social Forces 82 (4): 1457-1492.
  50. Mitchell RK, Agle BR, Wood DJ. 1997. Toward a theory of stakeholder identification and salience: Defining the principle of who and what really counts. Academy of Management Review 22 : 853-886.
  51. Patten DM. 1991. Exposure, legitimacy, and social disclosure. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 10 : 297-308.
  52. Patten DM. 1992. Intra-industry environmental disclosures in response to the Alaskan oil spill: A note on legitimacy theory. Accounting, Organizations and Society 17 (5): 471-475.
  53. Proffitt WT Jr, Spicer A. 2006. Shaping the shareholder activism agenda: Institutional investors and global social issues. Strategic Organization 4 (2): 165-190.
  54. Rees JV. 1994. Hostages of Each Other: The Transformation of Nuclear Safety Since Three Mile Island . University of Chicago Press: Chicago.
  55. Rehbein K, Waddock S, Graves SB. 2004. Understanding shareholder activism: Which corporations are targeted? Business & Society 43 (3): 239-267.
  56. Rivera J, deLeon P, Koerber C. 2006. Is greener whiter yet? The Sustainable Slopes program after five years. The Policy Studies Journal 34 (2): 195-221.
  57. Roberts RW. 1992. Determinants of corporate social responsibility disclosure: An application of stakeholder theory. Accounting, Organizations and Society 17 (6): 595-612.
  58. Rowley TJ, Moldoveaunu M. 2003. When will stakeholder groups act? An interest- and identitybased model of stakeholder group mobilization. Academy of Management Review 28 (2): 204-219.
  59. Ryan LV, Schneider M. 2002. The antecedents of institutional investor activism. Academy of Management Review 27 (4): 554-573.
  60. Schneiberg M, Lounsbury M. 2008. Social movements and institutional analysis. In The SAGE Handbook of Organizational Institutionalism , Greenwood R, Oliver C, Sahlin K, Suddaby R. Sage Publications: London: 648-670.
  61. Shimshack JP, Ward MB. 2005. Regulator reputation, enforcement, and environmental compliance. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 50 : 519-540.
  62. Shimshack JP, Ward MB. 2008. Enforcement and over-compliance. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 55 (1): 90-105.
  63. Short JL, Toffel MW. 2008. Coerced confessions: Self-policing in the shadow of the regulator. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 24 (1): 45-71.
  64. Tarrow, S. 1998. Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics. Cambridge University Press: New York.
  65. Toffel MW, Marshall JD. 2004. Improving environmental performance assessment: Comparative analysis of weighting methods used to evaluate chemical release inventories. Journal of Industrial Ecology 8(1-2): 143-172.
  66. Walsh JP, Kosnik RD. 1993. Corporate raiders and their disciplinary role in the market for corporate control. Academy of Management Journal 36 : 671-700.
  67. Weber K, Thomas LG, Rao H. 2009. From streets to suites: How the anti-biotechnology movement affected German pharmaceutical firms. American Sociological Review 74 (1): 106-127.
  68. Wood DJ. 1991. Corporate social performance revisited. Academy of Management Review 16 : 691-719.

Cited by

Sorted by citations

Authors
Reid, E. M., & Toffel, M. W.
Affiliations
Harvard University (US)
Corresponding author
Toffel, Michael W.
ORCID
Venue
Strategic Management Journal
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2009-07-31
Volume
30
Issue
11
Pages
1157-1178
ISSN
  • 0143-2095 (ISSN-L)
  • 1097-0266
DOI
10.1002/smj.796
OpenAlex
W3124076488
Cited by
1,093
References
4
Citations by year
2026: 72 · 2025: 79 · 2024: 91 · 2023: 95 · 2022: 75 · 2021: 109 · 2020: 61 · 2019: 52 · 2018: 72 · 2017: 71 · 2016: 60 · 2015: 56 · 2014: 44 · 2013: 63 · 2012: 48
FWCI
88.41
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
onlinelibrary.wiley.com/termsAndConditions#vor (vor)
Locations
  • Strategic Management Journal (publishedVersion)
  • SSRN Electronic Journal (acceptedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
Funders
  • Shell
  • Harvard Business School
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Corporate Social Responsibility Reporting
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Marketing › Environmental Sustainability in Business
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Political Influence and Corporate Strategies
Keywords
shareholder resolutions, social movements, shareholder activism, regulatory threats, greenhouse gas emissions, organizational change, spillover effects, corporate environmental strategy

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review