The DOI matches its Crossref record; 29 of the 29 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Measuring Beliefs in an Experimental Lost Wallet Game
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Citations
Cites
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Cited by
Harrison, G. W., & List, J. A. (2004) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/0022051043004577 · Cited by 2,099
A theory of sequential reciprocity
Dufwenberg, M., & Kirchsteiger, G. (2004) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2003.06.003 · Cited by 1,867
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Self-citationLIES IN DISGUISE-AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY ON CHEATING
Fischbacher, U., & Föllmi-Heusi, F. (2013) · Journal of the European Economic Association · doi:10.1111/jeea.12014 · Cited by 1,243
Metadata
- Authors
- Dufwenberg, M., & Gneezy, U.
- Venue
- Games and Economic Behavior
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2000-02
- Volume
- 30
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 163-182
- ISSN
- 0899-8256 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2137544677
- Cited by
- 453
- References
- 29
- FWCI
- 33.24
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.