The DOI matches its Crossref record; 29 of the 29 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Measuring Beliefs in an Experimental Lost Wallet Game
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Metadata
- Authors
- Dufwenberg, M., & Gneezy, U.
- Venue
- Games and Economic Behavior
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2000-02
- Volume
- 30
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 163-182
- ISSN
- 0899-8256 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2137544677
- Cited by
- 453
- References
- 29
- FWCI
- 33.24
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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