The DOI matches its Crossref record; 38 of the 38 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Auction Protocols for Decentralized Scheduling
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Citations
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Multiagent systems: algorithmic, game-theoretic, and logical foundations
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Nisan, N., & Ronen, A. (2001) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1006/game.1999.0790 · Cited by 1,331
Combinatorial Auctions: A Survey
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Privacy preserving auctions and mechanism design
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A survey of multi-agent organizational paradigms
HORLING, B., & LESSER, V. (2004) · The Knowledge Engineering Review · doi:10.1017/s0269888905000317 · Cited by 709
Metadata
- Authors
- Wellman, M. P., Walsh, W. E., Wurman, P. R., & MacKie-Mason, J. K.
- Venue
- Games and Economic Behavior
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2001-04
- Volume
- 35
- Issue
- 1-2
- Pages
- 271-303
- ISSN
- 0899-8256 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2131801993
- Cited by
- 429
- References
- 38
- FWCI
- 58.14
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.