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Public Good Markets: The Possible Role of Hybrid Governance Structures in Institutions for Sustainability
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“The role of these two instruments is important because every market arena is embedded within a set of institutional structures that constrain and either incentivize or disincentivize the prosocial behavior of the actors within the arena (Huylenbroeck et al., 2009; Ostrom, 1998).”
From Win Together or Lose Alone: Circular Economy and Hybrid Governance for Natural Resource Commons (2024) · cites this paper as Huylenbroeck et al., 2009
In the citing paper
“Natural resource commons are part of the arena, and the institutions interfacing with them can influence their sustainability through the implementation of circular economy practices (Bulte and Ruben, 2023; Huylenbroeck et al., 2009).”
From Win Together or Lose Alone: Circular Economy and Hybrid Governance for Natural Resource Commons (2024) · cites this paper as Huylenbroeck et al., 2009
In the citing paper
“Institutions organize processes for the preservation of natural resource commons but bear transaction costs that are proportional to the complexity involved.”
From Win Together or Lose Alone: Circular Economy and Hybrid Governance for Natural Resource Commons (2024) · cites this paper as Huylenbroeck et al., 2009
In the citing paper
“These institutions manage transaction costs, uncertainty, coordination, and other relevant aspects in the formation and exchange of property rights, as well as the manner and efficiency with which production and consumption incentives are mobilized (Huylenbroeck et al., 2009; Menard, 1995; North, 1990).”
From Win Together or Lose Alone: Circular Economy and Hybrid Governance for Natural Resource Commons (2024) · cites this paper as Huylenbroeck et al., 2009
In the citing paper
“Note that these policies can be delegated to hybrid institutions, especially those with a hierarchy involving public authorities, even as supervisors, and thus can fall within the tools that hybrid organizations Leonardo Becchetti et al. can use for managing natural common goods (Huylenbroeck et al., 2009).”
From Win Together or Lose Alone: Circular Economy and Hybrid Governance for Natural Resource Commons (2024) · cites this paper as Huylenbroeck et al., 2009
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Cited by
Sorted by citations
Win Together or Lose Alone: Circular Economy and Hybrid Governance for Natural Resource Commons
Becchetti, L., Bova, D. M., & Raffaele, L. (2024) · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4880178 · Cited by 16
Metadata
- Authors
- Huylenbroeck, G. V., Vuylsteke, A., & Verbeke, W.
- Venue
- Institutions and Sustainability
- Publisher
- Springer Netherlands
- Published
- 2009
- Pages
- 175-191
- Cited by
- 7
- References
- 0
- Language
- en
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