Cited by 546Cryptographic Implementations and SecurityCoding theory and cryptographyCryptography and Residue Arithmetic

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 57 of the 57 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 14 of the 32 sources its claims cite were checked for support.

Biclique Cryptanalysis of the Full AES

Open access
Bogdanov, Andrey, Khovratovich, Dmitry, Rechberger, Christian·2011·Lecture Notes in Computer Science

Overview

AI snapshot

Written from the paper’s full text.

TL;DR

This paper introduces biclique cryptanalysis and presents the first key-recovery attacks on the full AES-128, AES-192, and AES-256 faster than brute force, with complexities \(2^{126.1}\), \(2^{189.7}\), and \(2^{254.4}\), respectively. The attacks are in the single-key model and, because of their high computational complexity, do not threaten practical AES use.

Key findings

  • First key recovery on full AES-128 with complexity \(2^{126.1}\), full AES-192 with \(2^{189.7}\), and full AES-256 with \(2^{254.4}\); the paper reports an advantage of about a factor 3 to 5 over brute force depending on version.
  • Reduced-round and hash-mode results include 8-round AES-128 at \(2^{124.9}\), 9-round AES-192 at \(2^{188.8}\), 9-round AES-256 at \(2^{251.92}\), and compression-function preimages for full AES-128 (Miyaguchi-Preneel) at \(2^{125.83}\), AES-192 (Davies-Meyer) at \(2^{125.71}\), and AES-256 (Davies-Meyer) at \(2^{126.35}\), with success rate 0.632 for the preimage attacks.
  • The full-AES independent-biclique attacks use data complexities of \(2^{88}\), \(2^{80}\), and \(2^{40}\) plaintext-ciphertext pairs for AES-128, AES-192, and AES-256, respectively, with memory \(2^8\) and success probability 1.
  • The attacks do not assume related keys; most need only a small part of the codebook, and the paper reports practical verification of truncated differentials and the long-biclique construction for AES-256.

Methods

  • Biclique cryptanalysis partitions the key space into groups of \(2^{2d}\) keys indexed as \(K[i,j]\), constructs a \(d\)-dimensional biclique satisfying \(C_i = f_{K[i,j]}(S_j)\), and uses meet-in-the-middle/matching with precomputations to test \(2^{2d}\) keys with about \(2^d\) computations.
  • Two paradigms are used: long bicliques for remaining rounds via dependent related-key differential trails, and independent bicliques via independent related-key differentials plus matching with precomputations; the latter yields the full-AES key-recovery attacks.
  • The analysis is theoretical cryptanalysis of AES-128/192/256 and AES-based hash modes; complexity is evaluated by counting recomputed S-boxes, MixColumns operations, and key-schedule operations, with tables summarizing parameters and complexities.

Limitations

  • The paper states that the attacks are of high computational complexity and “do not threaten the practical use of AES in any way.”
  • The paper states that the long-biclique paradigm has very difficult biclique construction for many rounds, limiting the total number of rounds attacked, and that its data complexity can be very large.
  • Evident from the text: practical verification is partial rather than a full attack run—the authors verified truncated differentials, implemented the technically most complex long-biclique construction for AES-256, and checked super-box output differences, but did not execute the full key-recovery attacks.

Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1007/978-3-642-25385-0_19

Cites

57 of 57 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Verification

Claims the paper makes

101 No basis given · 49 Own interpretation · 15 Own result · 8 Own method · 6 No full text of the sources · 3 Couldn’t confirm · 2 Supported · 2 Partly supported · 1 Supported so far · 1 Mixed support · 1 Not checked yet · accuracy not yet measured

Verify all 1 references — free account

Show all 122 claims

  • Probably not a substantial claim. 32
  • It may state two separate claims as one. 34
  • The quote only partly states this claim. 6
67 of 67
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The AES-128 key schedule bijectively maps each key to subkey $8.

    “Since the AES-128 key schedule bijectively maps each key to $8, the enumeration is well-defined.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The AES-192 key schedule bijectively maps each key to $9||$10 L.

    “Since the AES-192 key schedule bijectively maps each key to $9||$10 L , the enumeration is well-defined.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The AES-256 key schedule bijectively maps each key to $12||$13.

    “Since the AES-256 key schedule bijectively maps each key to $12||$13, the enumeration is well-defined.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    No generic methods are known that would speed up key-recovery attacks given a part of the codebook.

    “To the best of our knowledge, there are no generic methods known that would speed-up key-recovery attacks given a part of the codebook.”
4 of 4

Claims other papers make about this one

Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.

5 of 5

Citations

Cites

Show all 56 references

Research works printed but not linked: 1

  1. Bahrak, B., Aref, M.R.: A Novel Impossible Differential Cryptanalysis of AES. In: Lucks, S., Sadeghi, A.-R., Wolf, C. (eds.) WEWoRC 2007. LNCS, vol. 4945, pp. 152–156. Springer, Heidelberg (2008)

Cited by

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Items 501–546 of 546

Metadata

Authors
Bogdanov, A., Khovratovich, D., & Rechberger, C.
Affiliations
  • KU Leuven (BE)
  • Microsoft (United States) (US)
  • Orange (France) (FR)
Venue
Lecture Notes in Computer Science
Published
2011
Volume
2011
Pages
344-371
ISSN
  • 0302-9743 (ISSN-L)
  • 1611-3349
OpenAlex
W1515595447
Cited by
546
References
56
Citations by year
2026: 9 · 2025: 15 · 2024: 23 · 2023: 25 · 2022: 22 · 2021: 36 · 2020: 33 · 2019: 41 · 2018: 29 · 2017: 36 · 2016: 38 · 2015: 71 · 2014: 53 · 2013: 54 · 2012: 55
FWCI
42.07
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
Licence
other-oa
Locations
  • Lecture notes in computer science (publishedVersion)
  • Lirias (KU Leuven) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
  • IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive (submittedVersion)
  • Technical University of Denmark, DTU Orbit (Technical University of Denmark, DTU) (submittedVersion)
Funders
European Commission
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Cryptographic Implementations and Security
  • Physical Sciences › Mathematics › Discrete Mathematics and Combinatorics › Coding theory and cryptography
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Cryptography and Residue Arithmetic
Keywords
Advanced Encryption Standard, AES-128, AES-192, AES-256, key recovery, block cipher cryptanalysis, compression function, Rijndael

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