The DOI matches its Crossref record; 33 of the 33 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The congressional-bureaucratic system: a principal agent perspective (with applications to the SEC)
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Citations
Cites
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Cited by
Weingast, B. R., & Marshall, W. J. (1988) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261528 · Cited by 1,527
Self-citationElectoral Politics as a Redistributive Game
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The Politics of Government Decision-Making: A Theory of Regulatory Capture
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Delegating powers: a transaction cost politics approach to policy making under separate powers
(2000) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.37-6536 · Cited by 910
THE POLITICAL EVOLUTION OF PRINCIPAL-AGENT MODELS
Miller, G. J. (2005) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.8.082103.104840 · Cited by 865
Metadata
- Authors
- Weingast, B. R.
- Venue
- Public Choice
- Published
- 1984
- Volume
- 44
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 147-191
- ISSN
- 0048-5829 (ISSN-L)
- 1573-7101
- OpenAlex
- W2080279551
- Cited by
- 503
- References
- 33
- FWCI
- 37.09
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.