The DOI matches its Crossref record; 21 of the 21 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Legislative choice of regulatory forms: Legal process or administrative process?
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Citations
Cites
The Theory of Economic Regulation
Stigler, G. J. (2021) · The Political Economy · doi:10.4324/9781315495811-8 · Cited by 5,483
Toward a More General Theory of Regulation
Peltzman, S. (1976) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/466865 · Cited by 4,729
Congress: The Electoral Connection, by David R. Mayhew
Page, B. I. (1975) · Political Science Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2148248 · Cited by 3,130
The Political Economy of Benefits and Costs: A Neoclassical Approach to Distributive Politics
Weingast, B. R., Shepsle, K. A., & Johnsen, C. (1981) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260997 · Cited by 1,736
Theories of Economic Regulation
Posner, R. (1974) · Edward Elgar Publishing eBooks · doi:10.3386/w0041 · Cited by 1,481
Congress: Keystone of the Washington Establishment
Ross, R. S., & Fiorina, M. P. (1977) · The Western Political Quarterly · doi:10.2307/447661 · Cited by 1,228
Self-citationPolitical resource allocation, controlled agendas, and the status quo
Romer, T., & Rosenthal, H. (1978) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/bf03187594 · Cited by 1,160
Wilson, J. Q. (2021) · The Political Economy · doi:10.4324/9781315495811-9 · Cited by 1,084
General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models
McKelvey, R. D. (1979) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911951 · Cited by 696
The Strategy of Ambiguity: Uncertainty and Electoral Competition
Shepsle, K. A. (1972) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1957799 · Cited by 614
Polluters’ Profits and Political Response: Direct Controls Versus Taxes
Buchanan, J. M., & Tullock, G. (2018) · The Theory and Practice of Command and Control in Environmental Policy · doi:10.4324/9781315197296-20 · Cited by 542
The End of Liberalism – The Second Republik of the United States
Lowi, T. J. (1981) · Verfassung in Recht und Übersee · doi:10.5771/0506-7286-1981-2-216 · Cited by 477
Waldo, D. (1948) · Michigan Law Review · doi:10.2307/1284717 · Cited by 396
The Public Use of Private Interest
Grether, E. T., & Schultze, C. L. (1978) · Journal of Marketing · doi:10.2307/1250099 · Cited by 380
Gardner, G. K., & Landis, J. M. (1938) · Harvard Law Review · doi:10.2307/1333942 · Cited by 375
The Political Economy of Regulation: Creating, Designing, and Removing Regulatory Forms.
Wolfe, A., & Mitnick, B. M. (1981) · Contemporary Sociology · doi:10.2307/2067755 · Cited by 307
Hoover, J. P., & Kolko, G. (1964) · The Western Political Quarterly · doi:10.2307/445814 · Cited by 259
Congress and the administrative state
Dodd, L. C., & Schott, R. L. (1979) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 231
Voters, bureaucrats and legislators
Fiorina, M. P., & Noll, R. G. (1978) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/0047-2727(78)90045-2 · Cited by 158
Self-citationGilchrist, D. T., & MacAvoy, P. W. (1967) · The Journal of Southern History · doi:10.2307/2204367 · Cited by 67
MACKAY, R. J., & Reid, J. D. (1979) · Elsevier eBooks · doi:10.1016/b978-0-12-733950-4.50015-8 · Cited by 8
Cited by
Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms
McCubbins, M. D., & Schwartz, T. (1984) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2110792 · Cited by 2,936
Delegating powers: a transaction cost politics approach to policy making under separate powers
(2000) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.37-6536 · Cited by 910
The Engines of European Integration: Delegation, Agency, and Agenda Setting in the EU
Pollack, M. A. (2003) · doi:10.1093/0199251177.001.0001 · Cited by 888
The Risk Game and the Blame Game
Hood, C. (2002) · Government and Opposition · doi:10.1111/1477-7053.00085 · Cited by 692
What happens when transparency meets blame-avoidance?
Hood, C. (2007) · Public Management Review · doi:10.1080/14719030701340275 · Cited by 573
Metadata
- Authors
- Fiorina, M.
- Venue
- Public Choice
- Published
- 1982
- Volume
- 39
- Issue
- 1
- ISSN
- 0048-5829 (ISSN-L)
- 1573-7101
- OpenAlex
- W1967900126
- Cited by
- 376
- References
- 21
- FWCI
- 22.40
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.