Two concepts of consciousness
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“Higher-Order Thought (HOT) theory [75] identifies consciousness with higher-order representations of one’s own mental states—a structure formally close to what we call introspection.”
From Self-Referential Introspection in Large Language Models: The Critical Threshold for Recursive Self-Improvement (2026) · cites this paper as [75]
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Howell, R. J. (2023) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192849236.003.0001
Howell, R. J. (2023) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192849236.002.0004
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Two kinds of seeing-as and singular content
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Top-down effects that are probably not cases of cognitive penetration
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Expressing Belief and Knowledge, Assertion, and the Expressivist Approach
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Metadata
- Authors
- Rosenthal, D. M.
- Affiliations
- The Graduate Center, CUNY (US)
- Corresponding author
- Rosenthal, David M.
- ORCID
- Rosenthal, David M.
- Venue
- Philosophical Studies
- Published
- 1986-05
- Volume
- 49
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 329-359
- ISSN
- 0031-8116 (ISSN-L)
- 1573-0883
- OpenAlex
- W1966913827
- Cited by
- 1,019
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 18 · 2025: 41 · 2024: 23 · 2023: 70 · 2022: 22 · 2021: 13 · 2020: 25 · 2019: 116 · 2018: 26 · 2017: 25 · 2016: 16 · 2015: 18 · 2014: 11 · 2013: 27 · 2012: 12
- FWCI
- 1.62
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
- Locations
- Philosophical Studies (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy
- Keywords
- consciousness, philosophy of mind, nature of consciousness
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