Two concepts of consciousness
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“Higher-Order Thought (HOT) theory [75] identifies consciousness with higher-order representations of one’s own mental states—a structure formally close to what we call introspection.”
From Self-Referential Introspection in Large Language Models: The Critical Threshold for Recursive Self-Improvement (2026) · cites this paper as [75]
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Horst, S. W. (2007) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195317114.003.0008
Reduction and Supervenience: The Contemporary Problematic in Philosophy of Mind
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“Actin' Funny, But I Don't Know Why” The Explanatory Gap
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Decision, Control, and Integration
Kirk, R. (2005) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0199285489.003.0007
Cognitive Pluralism and Naturalism
Horst, S. W. (2007) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195317114.003.0011
Consciousness and representation
Rowlands, M. (2001) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511487538.010
Content Externalism, Skepticism, and the Recognitional Conception of Self-Knowledge
Bar‐On, D. (2004) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0199276285.003.0005
De-sophisticating the Framework
Kirk, R. (2005) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0199285489.003.0008
Manifest Realism I: A Critique of Scientific Essentialism
Hanna, R. (2006) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199285549.003.0004
The structure of consciousness
Rowlands, M. (2001) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511487538.007
1 Varieties of Naturalism: What Is a Naturalistic Philosophy of Mind?
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The Distinctive Security Of Avowals: Ascriptive Immunity to Error
Bar‐On, D. (2004) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0199276285.003.0006
Avowals: ‘Grammar’ and Expression
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Zombies and Minimal Physicalism
Kirk, R. (2005) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0199285489.003.0002
Bodily Awareness and Self‐Knowledge
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Using “I” ‘as Subject’: Cartesian Reference or No Reference?
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The Epistemic Approach to Avowals' Security: Introspection and Transparency
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“Don't Know if I'm Comin' Up or Down” Reductive Strategies
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Jacob, P., & Jeannerod, M. (2003) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198509219.003.0003
Levine, J. (2001) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0195132351.003.0002
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O'Brien, L. F. (2007) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199261482.003.0002
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Horst, S. W. (2007) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195317114.003.0009
Direct Perceptual Realism I: The Refutation of Idealism
Hanna, R. (2006) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199285549.003.0002
Prospects for the Scientific Study of Phenomenal Consciousness
Papineau, D. (2002) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0199243824.003.0008
O'Brien, L. F. (2007) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199261482.003.0004
Multiple pathways in the primate visual system
Jacob, P., & Jeannerod, M. (2003) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198509219.003.0004
Consciousness and higher-order experience
Rowlands, M. (2001) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511487538.005
Robinson, W. S. (2004) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511498886.006
“You've Got Me Blowin', Blowin' My Mind” Eliminativism
Levine, J. (2001) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0195132351.003.0006
Levine, J. (2001) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0195132351.003.0001 · Cited by 23
Dissociations of visual functions by brain lesions in human patients
Jacob, P., & Jeannerod, M. (2003) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198509219.003.0005
Manifest Realism II: Why Gold is Necessarily a Yellow Metal
Hanna, R. (2006) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199285549.003.0005
Torobio, J. (2003) · Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1086/378873
Brigandt, I. (2003) · Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1086/378872
Consciousness and higher-order thoughts
Rowlands, M. (2001) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511487538.006 · Cited by 1
Robinson, W. S. (2004) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511498886.014
Robinson, W. S. (2004) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511498886.011
SKEPTICISM AND THE CAUSES OF QUALITATIVE EVENTS
Robinson, W. S. (2004) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511498886.009
Filosofické aspekty umělé inteligence
Tvrdý, F. (2011)
Unconscious higher-order thoughts (HOTs) as pre-reflective self-awareness?
Gennaro, R. J. (2016) · Animal Sentience · doi:10.51291/2377-7478.1174
The Existentialist Foundations Of Law
Tunoi, P. K. (2013)
The Appearance of Unity: A Higher-Order Interpretation of the Unity of Consciousness
Weisberg, J. (2001) · eScholarship (California Digital Library)
Exploration on the Plausibility of Digitizing Individual Self & Realization of Immortality
Tumanishvili, G. G. (2017) · Journal of consciousness exploration & research
Torley, V. J. (2009) · Minerva Access (University of Melbourne) · Cited by 3
Bauer, W. A. (2017) · Philosophia · doi:10.1007/s11406-017-9870-8
Illusions - a model of mindPreprint
Maniatis, M. (2017) · arXiv (Cornell University) · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1707.09379
Rowlatt, P. A. (2018) · UCL Discovery (University College London)
Consciousness: What Is It Like?
Smith, B. C. (2018) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-66754-6_6
Bringing very long term memories back to life
Larzabal, C. (2017) · theses.fr (ABES) · doi:10.70675/9c7cfd48zd8b8z4540z92e0z5c62087367cf
Emergence of meaning, signals and the concept of consciousness
Céspedes, E. (2018) · Filosofia Unisinos · doi:10.4013/fsu.2018.191.03
Emotion and predictive processing: emotions as perceptions?
Araya, J. M. (2018) · ERA
Brentano, Freud’s Philosophical Interlocutor
Wakefield, J. C. (2018) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-96343-3_6
Consciência e representação de segunda ordem: de Reinhold via Fichte a Rosenthal
Klotz, C. (2018) · Revista de Filosofia Aurora · doi:10.7213/1980-5934.30.051.ds04
Grounded Metacognitive Architectures For Machine Consciousness.
Chrisley, R. (2018) · Sussex Research Online (University of Sussex)
Composite Subjectivity and Psychological Subjects
Roelofs, L. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190859053.003.0007
Composite Subjectivity in Organisms, Organs, and Organizations
Roelofs, L. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190859053.003.0006
The Problems of Structural Discrepancy
Roelofs, L. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190859053.003.0004
Composite Subjectivity and Intelligent Subjects
Roelofs, L. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190859053.003.0005
A Universe of Composite Subjectivity
Roelofs, L. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190859053.003.0001
What It Is Like for Two to Become One
Roelofs, L. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190859053.003.0008
Composite Subjectivity and Microsubjects
Roelofs, L. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190859053.003.0003
Conscious Subjects, Conscious Unity, and Five Arguments for Anti-Combination
Roelofs, L. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190859053.003.0002
Uma objeção à concepção disposicional dos fenômenos mentais inconscientes
Prata, T. D. A. (2019) · Principia an international journal of epistemology · doi:10.5007/1808-1711.2018v22n3p507 · Cited by 3
Hoa, V. T., Thái, P. T., & Phuong, N. T. H. (2019) · Science & Technology Development Journal - Economics - Law and Management · doi:10.32508/stdjelm.v2i4.527
Perception, Consciousness, and Continuity
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Moral Identity and the Appearance of the Self
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Naturalizing Constraints: Equipollence and Continuity
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Rational Beings and Animal Souls
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Jorgensen, L. M. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198714583.003.0006
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Jonkisz, J. (2019) · Filozofia Nauki · doi:10.14394/filnau.2019.0011
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Vidal, J. (2018) · Crítica (México D F En línea) · doi:10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2018.16
Гаспарян, Д. Э. (2019) · Russian Journal of Philosophical Sciences · doi:10.30727/0235-1188-2019-62-5-97-123
Prata, T. D. A. (2019) · Sofia · doi:10.47456/sofia.v8i1.23767 · Cited by 1
Avowals: Expression, Content, and Truth
Bar‐On, D. (2004) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0199276285.003.0008
APRESENTAÇÃO DO ARTIGO “UMA TEORIA DA CONSCIÊNCIA” DE DAVID ROSENTHAL
Prata, T. D. A. (2019) · Perspectiva Filosófica · doi:10.51359/2357-9986.2017.241185
Does Inner Awareness Always Accompany Outer Awareness During Perception?
Chaturvedi, M. M., & Sarma, A. V. R. (2019) · Problemos · doi:10.15388/problemos.96.11
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Introduction: Philosophical Reflections on the Recent History of Philosophy
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John Rawls’s Political Liberalism
Schoelandt, C. V., & Gaus, G. F. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781316779651.024
Metadata
- Authors
- Rosenthal, D. M.
- Affiliations
- The Graduate Center, CUNY (US)
- Corresponding author
- Rosenthal, David M.
- ORCID
- Rosenthal, David M.
- Venue
- Philosophical Studies
- Published
- 1986-05
- Volume
- 49
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 329-359
- ISSN
- 0031-8116 (ISSN-L)
- 1573-0883
- OpenAlex
- W1966913827
- Cited by
- 1,019
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 18 · 2025: 41 · 2024: 23 · 2023: 70 · 2022: 22 · 2021: 13 · 2020: 25 · 2019: 116 · 2018: 26 · 2017: 25 · 2016: 16 · 2015: 18 · 2014: 11 · 2013: 27 · 2012: 12
- FWCI
- 1.62
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
- Locations
- Philosophical Studies (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy
- Keywords
- consciousness, philosophy of mind, nature of consciousness
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.