Two concepts of consciousness
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“Higher-Order Thought (HOT) theory [75] identifies consciousness with higher-order representations of one’s own mental states—a structure formally close to what we call introspection.”
From Self-Referential Introspection in Large Language Models: The Critical Threshold for Recursive Self-Improvement (2026) · cites this paper as [75]
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Pinkas, D. (1995) · La Découverte eBooks · doi:10.3917/dec.pinka.1995.01.0391
Peña-Guzmán, D. M., & Willett, C. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781316779651.038
Rowlands, M. (2001) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511487538.001
Robinson, W. S. (2004) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511498886.001
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Robinson, W. S. (2004) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511498886.004
Becker, K., & Thomson, I. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781316779651.001
Robinson, W. S. (2004) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511498886.008
Robinson, W. S. (2004) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511498886.003
Baxley, A. M. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781316779651.020
Teoria disposicional de Searle e o problema da causação mental inconsciente
Prata, T. D. A. (2022) · Revista Filosófica de Coimbra · doi:10.14195/0872-0851_61_4 · Cited by 3
Horst, S. W. (2007) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195317114.003.0001
Becker, K., & Thomson, I. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781316779651.060
Papineau, D. (2002) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0199243824.003.0003
O'Brien, L. F. (2007) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199261482.003.0007
Gligorov, N. (2016) · Studies in brain and mind · doi:10.1007/978-94-024-0965-9_8
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Papineau, D. (2002) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0199243824.003.0005
Zur Wissenschaftstheorie der Psychologie und Philosophie des Mentalen
Lenk, H. (2006) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/3-540-37637-2_31
Clément, F. (2006) · Travaux de sciences sociales · doi:10.3917/droz.cleme.2006.01.0341
Kirk, R. (2005) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0199285489.003.0006
O'Brien, L. F. (2007) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199261482.003.0010
O'Brien, L. F. (2007) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199261482.003.0001
Jorgensen, L. M. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198714583.003.0014
Benovsky, J. (2018) · SpringerBriefs in philosophy · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-05633-9_5
Kirk, R. (2005) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0199285489.003.0011
Kirk, R. (2005) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0199285489.003.0009
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Libedinsky, C. (2022) · OSF Preprints (OSF Preprints) · doi:10.31219/osf.io/k38pg
García‐Carpintero, M. (2022) · JOLMA · doi:10.30687/jolma/2723-9640/2022/01/007
Viendo lo que es visto: la atribución de autoconciencia a los animales
de Castro, I. R., & Iglesias, A. V. (2022) · Sincronía · doi:10.32870/sincronia.axxvi.n82.38b22
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¿ES LA CONSCIENCIA FENOMÉNICA PRODUCTO DE LA SELECCIÓN NATURAL O UN SUBPRODUCTO EVOLUTIVO?
Zambrano, N. A. (2023) · Límite · doi:10.4067/s0718-50652022000100216
Howell, R. J. (2023) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192849236.003.0003
Metadata
- Authors
- Rosenthal, D. M.
- Affiliations
- The Graduate Center, CUNY (US)
- Corresponding author
- Rosenthal, David M.
- ORCID
- Rosenthal, David M.
- Venue
- Philosophical Studies
- Published
- 1986-05
- Volume
- 49
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 329-359
- ISSN
- 0031-8116 (ISSN-L)
- 1573-0883
- OpenAlex
- W1966913827
- Cited by
- 1,019
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 18 · 2025: 41 · 2024: 23 · 2023: 70 · 2022: 22 · 2021: 13 · 2020: 25 · 2019: 116 · 2018: 26 · 2017: 25 · 2016: 16 · 2015: 18 · 2014: 11 · 2013: 27 · 2012: 12
- FWCI
- 1.62
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
- Locations
- Philosophical Studies (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy
- Keywords
- consciousness, philosophy of mind, nature of consciousness
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