Two concepts of consciousness
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“Higher-Order Thought (HOT) theory [75] identifies consciousness with higher-order representations of one’s own mental states—a structure formally close to what we call introspection.”
From Self-Referential Introspection in Large Language Models: The Critical Threshold for Recursive Self-Improvement (2026) · cites this paper as [75]
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On a confusion about a function of consciousness
Block, N. (1995) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00038188 · Cited by 3,364
“(See, for example, Rosenthal, 1986.”
InfluentialTime and the observer: The where and when of consciousness in the brain
Dennett, D. C., & Kinsbourne, M. (1992) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00068229 · Cited by 995
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Morin, A. (2006) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2005.09.006 · Cited by 316
“Other related proposals pertaining to the concept of consciousness and its various possible degrees have been offered since then (see Armstrong, 1981; Block, 1995; Nagel, 1974; Natsoulas, 1978; Rosenthal, 1986).”
BackgroundBotterill, G., & Carruthers, P. (1999) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511612428 · Cited by 312
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Jack, A. (2001) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/s0010-0277(00)00128-1 · Cited by 198
“only when we are having thoughts about that state (Rosenthal, 1986).”
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“While HOTT originated in philosophical circles (Rosenthal, 1986, 2002) and has mostly been couched in cognitive terms, it has more recently made its way into the arena of neuroscientific theories of consciousness (Lau & Rosenthal, 2011).”
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O'Brien, L. F. (2007) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199261482.001.0001 · Cited by 158
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(2008) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.46-2375 · Cited by 155
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“Some examples are: higher-order thought (Rosenthal, 1986, 2000), integrated information (Tononi et al., 1998; Tononi, 2004), neural correlates of consciousness (Crick and Koch, 1990; Koch, 2004), re-entrant interaction (Edelman, 1992, 2003), quantum coherence (Hameroff, 1994; Hameroff and Penrose,…”
BackgroundNon-human consciousness and the specificity problem: a modest theoretical proposal
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The function of consciousness or of information?
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Visibility Is Not Equivalent to Confidence in a Low Contrast Orientation Discrimination Task
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Metadata
- Authors
- Rosenthal, D. M.
- Affiliations
- The Graduate Center, CUNY (US)
- Corresponding author
- Rosenthal, David M.
- ORCID
- Rosenthal, David M.
- Venue
- Philosophical Studies
- Published
- 1986-05
- Volume
- 49
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 329-359
- ISSN
- 0031-8116 (ISSN-L)
- 1573-0883
- OpenAlex
- W1966913827
- Cited by
- 1,019
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 18 · 2025: 41 · 2024: 23 · 2023: 70 · 2022: 22 · 2021: 13 · 2020: 25 · 2019: 116 · 2018: 26 · 2017: 25 · 2016: 16 · 2015: 18 · 2014: 11 · 2013: 27 · 2012: 12
- FWCI
- 1.62
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
- Locations
- Philosophical Studies (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy
- Keywords
- consciousness, philosophy of mind, nature of consciousness
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