Two concepts of consciousness
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“Higher-Order Thought (HOT) theory [75] identifies consciousness with higher-order representations of one’s own mental states—a structure formally close to what we call introspection.”
From Self-Referential Introspection in Large Language Models: The Critical Threshold for Recursive Self-Improvement (2026) · cites this paper as [75]
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“So-called higher-order thought (‘HOT’) theories, for example, maintain that the relevant awareness is engendered by suitable thoughts that one is in the relevant mental state (Rosenthal 1986) or dispositions to have such thoughts (Carruthers 2005).”
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“Consciousness in that sense does not necessarily require self-consciousness: knowing that I, myself, have these experiences (Block (1995); Rosenthal (1986)).”
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Jean-Paul Sartre and the HOT Theory of Consciousness
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Anticonsumption Consciousness in Pursuit of Sustainability
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IN DEFENSE OF THE WHAT‐IT‐IS‐LIKENESS OF EXPERIENCE
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Explanatory Reduction, Conceptual Analysis, and Conceivability Arguments about the Mind
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Perception, Particulars and PredicatesPreprint
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“More specifically, we will use here the “self-reportability” criterion of the conscious state defined in previous studies and adopted by various theories such as the Global Neuronal Workspace theory (GNWT) of consciousness or Higher-order Thought (HOT) theories (Rosenthal 1986; Dehaene and Naccache 2001).”
MethodHigher-Order Thoughts, Animal Consciousness, and Misrepresentation: A Reply to Carruthers and Levine
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Metadata
- Authors
- Rosenthal, D. M.
- Affiliations
- The Graduate Center, CUNY (US)
- Corresponding author
- Rosenthal, David M.
- ORCID
- Rosenthal, David M.
- Venue
- Philosophical Studies
- Published
- 1986-05
- Volume
- 49
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 329-359
- ISSN
- 0031-8116 (ISSN-L)
- 1573-0883
- OpenAlex
- W1966913827
- Cited by
- 1,019
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 18 · 2025: 41 · 2024: 23 · 2023: 70 · 2022: 22 · 2021: 13 · 2020: 25 · 2019: 116 · 2018: 26 · 2017: 25 · 2016: 16 · 2015: 18 · 2014: 11 · 2013: 27 · 2012: 12
- FWCI
- 1.62
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
- Locations
- Philosophical Studies (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy
- Keywords
- consciousness, philosophy of mind, nature of consciousness
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