The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Skepticism, relevant alternatives, and deductive closure
Overview
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Citations
Cites
The Causal Theory of Perception
Grice, H. P., & White, A. R. (1961) · Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume · doi:10.1093/aristoteliansupp/35.1.121 · Cited by 958
Cited by
Williamson, T. (2002) · doi:10.1093/019925656x.001.0001 · Cited by 2,788
Williamson, T. (2007) · Wiley eBooks · doi:10.1002/9780470696675 · Cited by 2,277
Knowledge and Practical Interests
Stanley, J. (2005) · doi:10.1093/0199288038.001.0001 · Cited by 1,653
DeRose, K. (1995) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2186011 · Cited by 1,280
Hawthorne, J. (2003) · doi:10.1093/0199269556.001.0001 · Cited by 1,267
Contemporary debates in epistemology
(2005) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.43-0232 · Cited by 969
Pritchard, D. (2005) · doi:10.1093/019928038x.001.0001 · Cited by 874
Contextualism, Skepticism, and the Structure of Reasons
Cohen, S. (1999) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/0029-4624.33.s13.3 · Cited by 737
Cohen, S. (1988) · Philosophical Perspectives · doi:10.2307/2214070 · Cited by 617
Knowledge as Credit for True Belief
Greco, J. (2003) · Intellectual Virtue · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199252732.003.0006 · Cited by 360
Assertion, Knowledge, and Rational Credibility
Douven, I. (2006) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.1215/00318108-2006-010 · Cited by 357
Highlights of Recent Epistemology
Pryor, J. (2001) · The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1093/bjps/52.1.95 · Cited by 335
From Contextualism to Contrastivism
Schaffer, J. (2004) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1023/b:phil.0000029351.56460.8c · Cited by 277
Metadata
- Authors
- Stine, G. C.
- Venue
- Philosophical Studies
- Published
- 1976-04
- Volume
- 29
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 249-261
- ISSN
- 0031-8116 (ISSN-L)
- 1573-0883
- OpenAlex
- W2071855307
- Cited by
- 501
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 0.00
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.