The DOI matches its Crossref record; 27 of the 27 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
“Evolutionary” selection dynamics in games: Convergence and limit properties
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Cites
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Cited by
Young, H. P. (1993) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2951778 · Cited by 2,399
Multiagent systems: algorithmic, game-theoretic, and logical foundations
(2009) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.46-5662 · Cited by 1,756
Evolution of the Social Contract
Skyrms, B. (2014) · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139924825 · Cited by 743
Evolutionary Selection in Normal-Form Games
Ritzberger, K., & Weibull, J. W. (1995) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2171774 · Cited by 470
Potential Games with Continuous Player Sets
Sandholm, W. H. (2001) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1006/jeth.2000.2696 · Cited by 448
Metadata
- Authors
- Nachbar, J. H.
- Venue
- International Journal of Game Theory
- Published
- 1990-03
- Volume
- 19
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 59-89
- ISSN
- 0020-7276 (ISSN-L)
- 1432-1270
- OpenAlex
- W1980125776
- Cited by
- 272
- References
- 27
- FWCI
- 33.07
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
