Fixation probabilities in evolutionary dynamics under weak selection
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Abstract
In evolutionary dynamics, a key measure of a mutant trait’s success is the probability that it takes over the population given some initial mutant-appearance distribution. This “fixation probability” is difficult to compute in general, as it depends on the mutation’s effect on the organism as well as the population’s spatial structure, mating patterns, and other factors. In this study, we consider weak selection, which means that the mutation’s effect on the organism is small. We obtain a weak-selection perturbation expansion of a mutant’s fixation probability, from an arbitrary initial configuration of mutant and resident types. Our results apply to a broad class of stochastic evolutionary models, in which the size and spatial structure are arbitrary (but fixed). The problem of whether selection favors a given trait is thereby reduced from exponential to polynomial complexity in the population size, when selection is weak. We conclude by applying these methods to obtain new results for evolutionary dynamics on graphs.
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A simple rule for the evolution of cooperation on graphs and social networks
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Haldane, J. B. S. (1927) · Mathematical Proceedings of the Cambridge Philosophical Society · doi:10.1017/s0305004100015644 · Cited by 1,326 · cited 2×
“This question is typically answered by computing a trait’s fixation probability (Haldane 1927; Moran 1958; Kimura 1962; Patwa and Wahl 2008; Traulsen and Hauert 2010; Der et al. 2011; Hindersin and Traulsen 2014;McCandlish et al. 2015; Hindersin et al. 2016) as a function of the initial…”
BackgroundMethodBoros, E., & Hammer, P. L. (2002) · Discrete Applied Mathematics · doi:10.1016/s0166-218x(01)00341-9 · Cited by 827
Sigmund, K. (2010) · doi:10.1515/9781400832255 · Cited by 570 · cited 6×
“For a particular prisoner’s dilemma game (the “donation game”; Sigmund, 2010), we derive a formula for the fixation probability of cooperation from any starting configuration on an arbitrary weighted graph, generalizing and unifying a number of earlier results (Ohtsuki et al.”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialStrategy selection in structured populations
Tarnita, C. E., Ohtsuki, H., Antal, T., Fu, F., & Nowak, M. A. (2009) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2009.03.035 · Cited by 281
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Self-citationA mathematical formalism for natural selection with arbitrary spatial and genetic structure
Allen, B., & McAvoy, A. (2019) · Journal of Mathematical Biology · doi:10.1007/s00285-018-1305-z · Cited by 37
Self-citation
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Metadata
- Authors
- McAvoy, A., & Allen, B.
- Venue
- Journal of Mathematical Biology
- Published
- 2021-02
- Volume
- 82
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 14-14
- ISSN
- 0303-6812 (ISSN-L)
- 1432-1416
- OpenAlex
- W2968562364
- Cited by
- 74
- References
- 7
- FWCI
- 17.71
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- Licence
- www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
- www.springer.com/tdm (vor)
- Funders
- Army Research Laboratory (W911NF-18-2-0265)
- John Templeton Foundation (61443)
- National Science Foundation (DMS-1715315)
- Office of Naval Research (N00014-16-1-2914)
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