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The theory of contests: a survey
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Cited by
A technical survey on statistical modelling and design methods for crowdsourcing quality control
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Metadata
- Authors
- Corchón, L. C.
- Venue
- Review of Economic Design
- Published
- 2007-09-06
- Volume
- 11
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 69-100
- ISSN
- 0928-5040 (ISSN-L)
- 1434-4742
- 1434-4750
- OpenAlex
- W2117407563
- Cited by
- 253
- References
- 50
- FWCI
- 11.43
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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