The DOI matches its Crossref record; 21 of the 21 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Of, for, and by the people: the legal lacuna of synthetic persons
Open accessAbstract
Conferring legal personhood on purely synthetic entities is a very real legal possibility, one under consideration presently by the European Union. We show here that such legislative action would be morally unnecessary and legally troublesome. While AI legal personhood may have some emotional or economic appeal, so do many superficially desirable hazards against which the law protects us. We review the utility and history of legal fictions of personhood, discussing salient precedents where such fictions resulted in abuse or incoherence. We conclude that difficulties in holding “electronic persons” accountable when they violate the rights of others outweigh the highly precarious moral interests that AI legal personhood might protect.
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“A related worry is that extending moral consideration to near-term AI systems would come at the expense of humans' interests (Bryson et al. 2017)”
From Futures with Digital Minds: Expert Forecasts in 2025 (2025) · cites this paper as Bryson et al. 2017
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“In the EU, at least, however the general caution to avoid creating new legal personality for AI systems has been echoed manifold ( Siemaszko, Rodrigues, Slokenberga, 2020 ;Bryson, Diamantis, and Grant 2017 )”
From Legal and human rights issues of AI: Gaps, challenges and vulnerabilities (2020) · cites this paper as Bryson, Diamantis, and Grant 2017
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“This possibility led the European Parliament to propose”
From In support of “no-fault” civil liability rules for artificial intelligence (2021) · cites this paper as Bryson et al. 2017
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Cites
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Solaiman, S. M. (2017) · Artificial Intelligence and Law · doi:10.1007/s10506-016-9192-3 · Cited by 221 · cited 5×
“It is a kind of pretense in which legal systems can decide to engage, regardless of whether an entity really is a person (See examples in Solaiman 2017, pp. 3–4).”
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Cited by
Raji, I. D., Smart, A., White, R. N., Mitchell, M., Gebru, T., Hutchinson, B., Smith-Loud, J., Theron, D., & Barnes, P. (2020) · Proceedings of the 2020 Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency · doi:10.1145/3351095.3372873 · Cited by 2,245
“Although algorithms themselves cannot be held accountable as they are not moral or legal agents [7], the organizations designing and deploying algorithms can through governance structures.”
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Rodrigues, R. (2020) · Journal of Responsible Technology · doi:10.1016/j.jrt.2020.100005 · Cited by 494
Four Responsibility Gaps with Artificial Intelligence: Why they Matter and How to Address them
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“…by AI systems discussed by Schellekens (2018) and the introduction of electronic personhood proposed among others by the European Parliament resolution on Civil Law Rules on Robotics (Delvaux, 2017) and discussed among others by Koops et al. (2010) and, in a critical fashion, Bryson et al. (2017).”
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Trusting Automation: Designing for Responsivity and Resilience
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Metadata
- Authors
- Bryson, J. J., Diamantis, M. E., & Grant, T. D.
- Affiliations
- Princeton University (US)
- University of Iowa (US)
- University of Cambridge (GB)
- Corresponding author
- Bryson, Joanna J.
- Diamantis, Mihailis E.
- Grant, Thomas D.
- Venue
- Artificial Intelligence and Law
- Published
- 2017-09
- Volume
- 25
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 273-291
- ISSN
- 0924-8463 (ISSN-L)
- 1572-8382
- OpenAlex
- W2742760489
- Cited by
- 368
- References
- 21
- Citations by year
- 2026: 36 · 2025: 53 · 2024: 59 · 2023: 47 · 2022: 42 · 2021: 50 · 2020: 37 · 2019: 24 · 2018: 17 · 2017: 2
- FWCI
- 106.38
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Locations
- Artificial Intelligence and Law (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Law › Literary and Philosophical Studies
- Social Sciences › Law › Digitalization, Law, and Regulation
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Ethics and Social Impacts of AI
- Keywords
- legal personality, artificial intelligence, legal fiction, legal accountability, European Union law, moral status of AI, corporate personhood
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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