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The DOI matches its Crossref record; 21 of the 21 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Of, for, and by the people: the legal lacuna of synthetic persons

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Bryson, Joanna J., Diamantis, Mihailis E., Grant, Thomas D. · 2017 · Artificial Intelligence and Law

Abstract

Conferring legal personhood on purely synthetic entities is a very real legal possibility, one under consideration presently by the European Union. We show here that such legislative action would be morally unnecessary and legally troublesome. While AI legal personhood may have some emotional or economic appeal, so do many superficially desirable hazards against which the law protects us. We review the utility and history of legal fictions of personhood, discussing salient precedents where such fictions resulted in abuse or incoherence. We conclude that difficulties in holding “electronic persons” accountable when they violate the rights of others outweigh the highly precarious moral interests that AI legal personhood might protect.

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Cites

Show all 21 references

Research works printed but not linked: 8

  1. Asaro P (2007) Robots and responsibility from a legal perspective. In: The IEEE conference on robotics and automation, workshop on roboethics, Rome. Unpublished proceedings. http://www.peterasaro.org/writing/ASARO%20Legal%20Perspective.pdf
  2. Blair MM, Pollman E (2015) The derivative nature of corporate constitutional rights. William Mary Law Rev 1673:56
  3. Bryson JJ (2009) Building persons is a choice. Erwägen Wissen Ethik 20(2):195–197. (commentary on Anne Foerst, “Robots and Theology”)
  4. Burgess A, Burgess JP (2011) Truth (Princeton foundations of contemporary philosophy). Princeton University Press, Princeton
  5. Eklund M (2011) Fictionalism. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Mexico City
  6. Foerst A (2009) Robots and theology. Erwägen Wissen Ethik 20(2):181–193
  7. Garrett BL (2014) The constitutional standing of corporations. University of Pennnsylvania Law Review, vol 163
  8. Koops B-J, Hildebrandt M, Jaquet-Chiffelle D-O (2010) Bridging the accountability gap: rights for new entities in the information society. Minn J Law Sciende Technol 11:497–561

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Metadata

Authors
Bryson, J. J., Diamantis, M. E., & Grant, T. D.
Affiliations
  • Princeton University (US)
  • University of Iowa (US)
  • University of Cambridge (GB)
Corresponding author
  • Bryson, Joanna J.
  • Diamantis, Mihailis E.
  • Grant, Thomas D.
Venue
Artificial Intelligence and Law
Published
2017-09
Volume
25
Issue
3
Pages
273-291
ISSN
  • 0924-8463 (ISSN-L)
  • 1572-8382
OpenAlex
W2742760489
Cited by
368
References
21
Citations by year
2026: 36 · 2025: 53 · 2024: 59 · 2023: 47 · 2022: 42 · 2021: 50 · 2020: 37 · 2019: 24 · 2018: 17 · 2017: 2
FWCI
106.38
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
Artificial Intelligence and Law (publishedVersion, cc-by)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Law › Literary and Philosophical Studies
  • Social Sciences › Law › Digitalization, Law, and Regulation
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Ethics and Social Impacts of AI
Keywords
legal personality, artificial intelligence, legal fiction, legal accountability, European Union law, moral status of AI, corporate personhood

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Of, for, and by the people: the legal lacuna of synthetic persons. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1007/s10506-017-9214-9
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Bryson, J. J., Diamantis, M. E., & Grant, T. D. (2017). Of, for, and by the people: the legal lacuna of synthetic persons. Artificial Intelligence and Law. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10506-017-9214-9

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

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