Legal personality of robots, corporations, idols and chimpanzees: a quest for legitimacy
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The European Parliament proposed creating a specific legal status for robots, so that at least the most sophisticated autonomous robots could be established as having the status of electronic persons with specific rights and obligations.
“This possibility led the European Parliament to propose”
From In support of “no-fault” civil liability rules for artificial intelligence (2021) · cites this paper as Solaiman 2017
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“All the challenges mentioned above culminate in the academic discourse about legal personality of robots 55 , which may lead to alarming narratives of technological totalitarianism.”
BackgroundOf, for, and by the people: the legal lacuna of synthetic persons
Bryson, J. J., Diamantis, M. E., & Grant, T. D. (2017) · Artificial Intelligence and Law · doi:10.1007/s10506-017-9214-9 · Cited by 368 · see citing works
“It is a kind of pretense in which legal systems can decide to engage, regardless of whether an entity really is a person (See examples in Solaiman 2017, pp. 3–4).”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND THE LIMITS OF LEGAL PERSONALITY
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“To solve this problem, this article does not advocate that systems should be granted full legal-personhood [10] [64] [69] as this will come with a host of other problems, such as its being able to own property, sue (as well as being sued), and have its own legal rights.”
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“2010; Solaiman 2017; Bryson et al.”
BackgroundInfluentialMetahuman systems = humans + machines that learn
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“Legal constraints may prevent some forms of delegation, demanding responsibility from humans (Solaiman, 2017).”
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“Although the systems themselves cannot be granted legal personhood and held accountable, the organisations and individuals who may be bene fi ting through their development, deployment, and use can (Bryson et al., 2017; Solaiman, 2017).”
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Johnson, D. G., & Verdicchio, M. (2018) · Ethics and Information Technology · doi:10.1007/s10676-018-9481-5 · Cited by 64 · see citing works
“2 Some scholars, like Solaiman, turn to animals as a model to deny that robots should be granted personhood (Solaiman 2017).”
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Legaspi, R., Xu, W., Konishi, T., Wada, S., Kobayashi, N., Naruse, Y., & Ishikawa, Y. (2024) · Knowledge-Based Systems · doi:10.1016/j.knosys.2023.111298 · Cited by 64 · see citing works
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“In this way we can sidestep questions of the personhood of AI systems [57].”
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“35 Since society depends on cooperation, which depends on trust, if robots are to participate in society, they must be designed to be trustworthy.”
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“Scholars have argued that adopting similar proposals would be neither beneficial, necessary, nor desirable [44].”
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“2017; Solaiman 2017), but also to legislative initiatives (Committee on Legal Affairs (2015).5 However, often times the discussion in this context centers on liability issues which are a different question from the grant of moral copyrights (Miernicki and Ng 2019); the attribution of liability is…”
BackgroundAI for Everyone? Critical Perspectives
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“…Wageningen University & Research, Wageningen, The Netherlands 1 3 example in the form of intelligent military robots (Hellström 2013; Sparrow 2007), industrial robots (Solaiman 2017), or self-driving cars (Nyholm and Smids 2016), have far-reaching moral, social, and legal consequences.”
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AI and international law – Legal personality and avenues for regulation
Hárs, A. (2022) · Hungarian Journal of Legal Studies · doi:10.1556/2052.2022.00352 · Cited by 20 · see citing works
Staszkiewicz, P., Horobiowski, J., Szelągowska, A., & Strzelecka, A. M. (2024) · Meditari Accountancy Research · doi:10.1108/medar-10-2023-2204 · Cited by 29 · see citing works
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“31 Coleman (2001), 274 and Solaiman (2017).”
Bhatt, H., Bahuguna, R., Singh, R., Gehlot, A., Akram, S. V., Priyadarshi, N., & Twala, B. (2022) · Applied Sciences · doi:10.3390/app122211687 · Cited by 17 · see citing works
Punishing Artificial Intelligence: Legal Fiction or Science Fiction
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“…intelligence robots reaches this stage sometime in the future, then it becomes highly persuasive to grant them an artificial legal personality, which suggests the ability to hold property, the right to sue and be sued, and the right to work and earn an income and to be paid on time (Solaiman 2017).”
BackgroundInfluentialEmbodiment, Anthropomorphism, and Intellectual Property Rights for AI Creations
Somaya, D., & Varshney, L. R. (2018) · Proceedings of the AAAI/ACM Conference on AI Ethics and Society · doi:10.1145/3278721.3278754 · Cited by 14 · see citing works
Discrimination against robots: Discussing the ethics of social interactions and who is harmed
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Indigenous Water Rights in Law and Regulation: Lessons from Comparative Experience
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Legal Person- or Agenthood of Artificial Intelligence Technologies
Kerikmäe, T., Müürsepp, P., Pihl, H. M., Hamuľák, O., & Kocharyan, H. (2020) · Acta Baltica Historiae et Philosophiae Scientiarum · doi:10.11590/abhps.2020.2.05 · Cited by 11 · see citing works
“…the requirements or attributes of legal personhood are: (1) a person shall be capable of being a subject of law; (2) being a legal subject entails the ability to exercise rights and to perform duties; and (3) the enjoyment of rights needs to exercise awareness and choice (Solaiman, 2017, p. 161).”
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IN THE REALM OF THE MACHINES: AI'S INFLUENCE UPON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY
Usman, H., Tariq, I., & Nawaz, B. (2023) · JUNE · doi:10.53664/jsrd/04-02-2023-13-383-399 · Cited by 4 · see citing works
“Journal of Social Research Development, Volume 4, Issue 2, JUNE, 2023 389 how complex AI systems can be (Solaiman, 2017).”
BackgroundThe Rise of AI Avatars: Legal Personhood, Rights and Liabilities in an Evolving Metaverse
Cheong, B. C. (2024) · Journal of Digital Technologies and Law · doi:10.21202/jdtl.2024.42 · Cited by 9 · see citing works
Mapping the emerging legal landscape for neuroprostheses: Human interests and legal resources
Akmazoglu, T. B., & Chandler, J. A. (2021) · Developments in neuroethics and bioethics · doi:10.1016/bs.dnb.2021.08.002 · Cited by 9 · see citing works
“Today, all human beings are legal persons, and non-human objects and abstractions such as rivers and corporations have limited forms of legal personhood (Bryson et al, 2017; Solaiman, 2017).”
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Towards Granting of Legal Personality to Autonomous Robots in the UAE
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“By some definitions, legal personhood is comprised not only of rights given but also of the rights holder’s duties (Solaiman, 2017), although this is not explicitly enshrined in the law (Kurki, 2019).”
THE NATURE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND THE PROBLEM OF LEGAL PERSONALITY DETERMINATION
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Copyrights to the Results of Artificial Intelligence Activity and Means of Their Protection
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Subject Structure of the Offense in Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Robotics
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AI as Legal Persons: Past, Patterns, and ProspectsPreprint
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“Neuroderechos”, prueba neurocientífica y garantía de independencia judicial
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Inclusion of Humanoid Robots in Human Society: Ethical Issues
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Explaining the Punishment Gap of AI and Robots.
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The intelligent machine: a new metaphor through which to understand both corporations and AI
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“Solaiman (2017, 35–36), for his part, argues that the legal personhood ascribed to corporations cannot be applied to robots because machines lack the “fundamental tenets of such legal recognition,” and those who liken robotic personhood to corporate and personhood ignore that, unlike the…”
BackgroundThe Desirability of Legal Rights for Novel Beings
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Artificial Intelligence and Legal Subjectivity
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Hybrid theory of corporate legal personhood and its application to artificial intelligence
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Liability Analysis of Autonomous Vehicles Accidents
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Rivers as Subjects and Indigenous Water Rights in Colombia
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“Roman law restricted the legal personality for a long time to the family’s head only.(7) The head of the family is the one who enjoys nature without the slaves, women, or children.”
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- Authors
- Solaiman, S. M.
- Affiliations
- University of Wollongong (AU)
- Corresponding author
- Solaiman, S. M.
- ORCID
- Solaiman, S. M.
- Venue
- Artificial Intelligence and Law
- Published
- 2016-11-14
- Volume
- 25
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 155-179
- ISSN
- 0924-8463 (ISSN-L)
- 1572-8382
- OpenAlex
- W2550953130
- Semantic Scholar
- 68f9887afdbe992e41d6eee4208ab15c2d51cdcf
- Cited by
- 221
- References
- 61
- Citations by year
- 2026: 9 · 2025: 20 · 2024: 24 · 2023: 36 · 2022: 36 · 2021: 34 · 2020: 21 · 2019: 26 · 2018: 10 · 2017: 5
- FWCI
- 69.15
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Artificial Intelligence and Law (publishedVersion)
- Research Online (University of Wollongong) (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- Health and Safety Executive
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Literary and Philosophical Studies
- Social Sciences › Law › Digitalization, Law, and Regulation
- Social Sciences › Law › Animal Law and Welfare
- Keywords
- legal personality, robots, industrial robots, corporate personality, idols, animal personality, personhood, liability, autonomous robots
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